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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―[T]he sovereign and the nation must never forget that land is 
the sole source of wealth . . . .‖ 
Francois Quesnay (1694–1774)
1
 
 
The history of racially discriminatory housing policies and lending 
practices in the United States, including practices such as redlining
2
 and 
 
1. Francois Quesnay, General Rules for the Economic Government of an Agricultural Kingdom 
(1846), translated in VOICES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: SELECTED READINGS FROM THE 
LIBERAL ECONOMISTS AND THEIR CRITICS 3 (John Bowditch & Clement Ramsland eds., 1961) 
(noting that Quesnay‘s essay, originally written in 1760, was subsequently published in an 1846 
collection of works by leading French economists).  A French economist and physician, Quesnay 
attempted to explain the source of economic growth in his Tableau Économique by understanding the 
relationship between the various economic classes in society.  MARK BLAUG, GREAT ECONOMISTS 
BEFORE KEYNES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIVES & WORKS OF ONE HUNDRED GREAT 
ECONOMISTS OF THE PAST 194–96 (1986).  Quesnay identified three classes: ―‗sterile‘‖ classes, 
farmers, and landowners.  See id.  Sterile classes included those involved in industry and 
manufacturing, and according to Quesnay, these classes consumed all that they produced, leaving no 
surplus for succeeding periods.  Id.  The agricultural sector was believed by Quesnay to be the only 
class capable of producing a surplus that could help in growing the economy.  Id.  He was an 
advocate of laissez-faire economics and, in fact, coined the term.  Id.  Quesnay was thought to be the 
intellectual leader of the first school of economic thinking, called the ―Physiocrats,‖ and his work 
―paved the way for classical economics.‖  1 MANFRED WEISSENBACHER, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW 
ENERGY FORGES HUMAN HISTORY 295 (2009). 
2. MEIZHU LUI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL 
WEALTH DIVIDE 95, 103 (2006) (discussing the earliest practice of ―redlining‖ by the Home Owners‘ 
Loan Corporation, created in 1933 under the New Deal housing programs by the federal government 
to assist homeowners to avoid foreclosure).  See also Subprime Lenders Target Minorities: Study 
Finds African-American, Hispanics Pay Higher Loan Rates than Whites with Similar Incomes, 
CNN.com (May 1, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/01/pf/banking/subprime (discussing 
discrepancies in rates of subprime lending to minorities); Craig Torres, Regulators Kept Quiet as 
Subprime Lenders ―Targeted‖ Minorities, Bloomberg.com (June 13, 2007), 
http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007-June-13_Bloombergv2.pdf (discussing investigations 
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steering,
3
 created a community of historically disadvantaged borrowers among 
black Americans.
4
  Over time, these borrowers grew accustomed to exploitive 
financial services, were targeted by subprime and predatory lenders, and 
became victims of our current mortgage crisis.
5
 
My thesis is that blacks are experiencing a new iteration of intentional 
housing discrimination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the form 
of a dual mortgage market.  In this dual mortgage market, lenders identify 
vulnerable emerging and underserved markets
6
 of blacks and knowingly target 
them to receive subprime or predatory loan products when similarly situated 
white borrowers (i.e., white borrowers with similar credit histories, economic 
status, and other borrower characteristics typically important to the lending 
decision) are given superior, prime mortgage products.
7
 
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the history of housing and lending 
discrimination in the United States.  I show that the disparities in subprime 
 
into subprime lenders‘ targeting of minorities); see infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
3. Traditionally, steering was the practice of directing blacks into segregated neighborhoods.  
Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 810 nn.10–11 
(1976).  In the subprime context, steering has taken on new meaning and refers to the process of 
marketing subprime products to blacks.  Gregory D. Squires, Predatory Lending: Redlining in 
Reverse, National Housing Institute: Shelterforce Online (January/February 2005), 
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/139/redlining.html. 
4. ―Historically disadvantaged borrowers‖ refers to black borrowers as a class of minority 
borrowers. 
5. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD 
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (2005); MELVIN L. 
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
RACIAL INEQUALITY 12–13 (2d ed. 2006); LUI ET AL., supra note 2; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE 
HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004); 
Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social 
Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1218–19 (2004) 
(―Black Americans experience a number of problems in their efforts to obtain and use credit.  Of 
particular concern is their vulnerability to so-called ‗predatory lenders.‘ . . .  Examples of targeted 
consumers include women [and] minorities. . . .‖) (citation omitted). 
6. Richard Williams et al., The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending, 52 
SOC. PROBS. 181, 191 (2005) (discussing commonly used income and race-based definitions of 
underserved markets and stating that alternative definitions that are frequently used yield results that 
are consistent with the study‘s finding of racially biased mortgage lending).  The term ―emerging 
markets‖ is broadly understood to include potential borrowers who may have difficulty 
demonstrating a conventional credit history, may be unfamiliar with the credit system, or may have 
credit concerns.  See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 11, 16, 31–80, 152, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., 
No. 08-2474-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. June 3, 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
Cago/docs/press/2008_06_03_option_one_suit_attachment1.pdf. 
7. See infra Parts III–V; see also William Apgar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage 
Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101, 102 (Xavier de 
Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (―High-cost lenders disproportionately target minority, especially African 
American, borrowers and communities, resulting in a noticeable lack of prime loans among even the 
highest-income minority borrowers.‖). 
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lending experienced by black borrowers result from intentional reverse 
redlining and steering by lenders. 
Next, in Part III, I analyze why black borrowers are disproportionately 
victims of subprime mortgages and predatory lending.  I review various forms 
of evidence of intentional discrimination gathered from audit studies,
8
 
individual affidavits, and advertising and marketing literature, in combination 
with statistical evidence of disparate impact, to make the case of intentional 
housing discrimination. 
Part IV presents my study using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
9
 
data prepared and distributed by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council pursuant to the Federal Reserve Board‘s Regulation C, as well as 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data for the years 1998, 2002, and 
2006 and disaggregated into the individual fifty states.  The study presents an 
analysis of the 1998 HMDA data set containing 11,000,077 reported mortgage 
applications; the 2002 HMDA data set containing 14,198,111 reported 
mortgage applications; and the 2006 HMDA data set containing 21,735,287 
reported mortgage applications.
10
  The HMDA data from 2002 and 2006 
contain additional borrower and property information as a result of the 2002 
amendments to HMDA regulations.
11
  The study also used the HUD data set of 
subprime lenders (HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders)
12
 as a tool to identify 
those lenders that were prone to give out subprime loans.
13
  Additionally, the 
study used the HMDA criteria to identify subprime lenders that define a 
subprime loan as any loan in which the annual percentage rate is three 
percentage points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities 
(Alternative Measure).
14
  To determine the effect of race of the borrower on the 
 
8. An audit refers to a survey technique in which persons (auditors) are trained to visit housing 
agents, lenders, brokers, and others in teams of two and to record how they are treated.  John Yinger, 
Housing Discrimination Is Still Worth Worrying About, 9 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 893, 894 (1998).  
One of the auditors will be a protected class member as defined by civil rights laws and the other will 
not be a member of a protected class.  Id.  The auditor who is not part of a protected class is 
considered part of the control group.  Id.  The protected class auditor will be given borrower 
characteristics (in the case of borrower audit studies) that make her equally if not more qualified than 
the non-protected class auditor to receive a particular type of loan.  Id.  ―Discrimination is defined as 
systematically less favorable treatment of the auditors in the protected class.‖  Id.  
9. See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text discussing HMDA, its origin, and its purposes. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
13. See United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Data Sets: HUD 
Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List, http://www.huduser.org/ 
portal/datasets/manu.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter HUD User Data Sets] (listing 
subprime lenders). 
14. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED. 
RES. BULL. A123, A126 (2006) (discussed as higher priced home lending); Home Mortgage 
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lender‘s behavior, the study used two methods: difference of means tests15 and 
logit analysis.
16
  First, the study used difference of means tests to compare 
applicant and lending behavior on subprime loans for white and black 
borrowers (State Data Means Test).  The study provides overwhelming 
evidence that black borrowers are carrying the brunt of the subprime market.
17
  
Second, the study used logit analysis to predict the probability that a borrower 
will receive a subprime (versus a prime) loan (State Data Control Test).  Using 
logit analysis allowed me to control for borrower characteristics, including 
race, house characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics.  This analysis 
demonstrates that, in the majority of states, being black increases the likelihood 
that a borrower will receive a subprime loan, even when neighborhood 
characteristics, the income of the borrower, and the value of the house are 
controlled for.
18
  While the study could not control for all of the factors that 
lenders examine when making loans, this analysis shows that when 
neighborhood characteristics, borrower income, and the value of the houses are 
held constant, black borrowers are significantly more likely to receive a 
subprime loan product than are white borrowers in the majority of states.  As 
explained in Part IV, this analysis allows me to remove the effects of 
neighborhood characteristics, borrower income, and value of the house, and 
examine the effect of race without these competing factors.  Tables containing 
the data from the study are found in the appendix to this Article.  As Table 6 
shows, being a black borrower is continually, statistically significant, while 
other factors fall in and out of significance. 
In Part V, I discuss direct evidence of intentional discrimination.  
Testimony from industry insiders, judicial opinions, and audit studies are the 
primary sources of evidence of intentional discrimination.  Combined, the 
evidence presented in Parts III through V makes the case of intentional 
discrimination based upon race in the subprime market. 
In Part VI, I focus on American society‘s historically race-related 
 
Disclosure Act: Newly Collected Data and What It Means: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong.  
47–49 (2006) (statement of Michael E. Staten, Professor and Director, Credit Research Center at the 
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109-99.pdf.  The reporting thresholds differ based upon 
lien status.  The threshold for first mortgages is an annual percentage rate that is three percentage 
points or more above the yield for a comparable Treasury security and the threshold for subordinate 
mortgages is five percentage points.  The justification for the difference is the percentages reflect 
differences in credit risk, among other things.  Avery et al., supra, at A126; Home Mortgage 
Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218 (June 27, 2002) (amendments effective January 1, 2004).  
15. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.  
16. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra Part IV.D and Tables 1–6. 
18. See infra Part IV.D. 
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propensities to target black borrowers through wealth-stripping home 
mortgage and refinancing schemes and consider whether there is something 
unique about the experiences of black borrowers that predisposes them to 
accept loan products that are virtually designed to fail.  Necessarily, this Part 
considers the role of ―cultural affinity‖19 and the sociology of the poor and of 
the minority in exploring why black borrowers were especially vulnerable to 
this new form of housing inequality. 
Part VII concludes by reiterating the importance of focusing on the 
intentional aspect of the subprime and predatory lending discrimination that 
has created a dual mortgage market in the United States. 
II.  CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SUBPRIME PRODUCTS: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
If progress has been made to increase access to capital for 
racial minorities, . . . that progress has always come with 
great struggle.  And it appears there are few, if any, 
permanent victories.  The emergence of predatory lending 
practices demonstrates that the struggle against redlining has 
not been won, but has simply taken some new turns.
20
 
American housing discrimination norms and the attendant inequality in 
treatment experienced by the victims of housing discrimination have changed 
over time.
21
  In the 1990s mortgage lenders reinvented discriminatory lending 
and housing policies in the form of discriminatory subprime and predatory 
lending.
22
  Steering, reverse redlining,
23 
and discriminatory mortgage lending 
 
19. STEPHEN L. ROSS & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 213 (2002); Raphael W. Bostic, A 
Test of Cultural Affinity in Home Mortgage Lending, 23 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 89, 89–94 (2003); 
Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping 
Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634, 635 (1994); William C. Hunter & 
Mary Beth Walker, The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, 13 J. REAL 
EST. FIN. & ECON. 57, 67 (1996). 
20. Squires, supra note 3. 
21. Juliet Saltman, Theoretical Orientation: Residential Segregation, in URBAN HOUSING 
SEGREGATION OF MINORITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 9–11 
(Elizabeth D. Huttman, Wim Blauw & Juliet Saltman eds., 1991) (discussing the historical racial 
inequality and division attending housing segregation). 
22. See infra notes 39–45 and accompanying text (discussing predatory lending).  Previously, 
discriminatory lending and housing policies manifested themselves through redlining, segregation in 
selling and renting, and insufficiency of affordable housing. 
23. Squires, supra note 3. 
After decades of redlining practices that starved many urban communities 
for credit and denied loans to racial minorities, today a growing number of 
financial institutions are flooding these same markets with exploitative loan 
products that drain residents of their wealth.  Such ―reverse redlining‖ may be 
as problematic for minority families and older urban neighborhoods as has been 
the withdrawal of conventional financial services. 
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practices were primary implements of discrimination against blacks.  
Research reveals that many of the subprime mortgage loans and mortgage 
refinance packages offered to blacks were bad products that have done more 
to hamper than to help efforts to increase home ownership among blacks.
24
  
More disturbing is the evidence that lending institutions, their loan officers, 
and brokers (collectively, lenders) knew at the time these products were being 
specifically marketed to blacks that these borrowers were receiving inferior 
products.  Estimates are that one half of all subprime borrowers actually 
qualified for conventional financing, a disproportionate number of which were 
black borrowers,
25
 even after accounting for ―legitimate risk factors‖26 such as 
 
Id. 
24. More than 6 million borrowers accepted subprime loans between 1998 and 2006 and many 
already have or will lose their homes to foreclosure.  ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR 
COST TO HOMEOWNERS 2–3 (2006). 
The Center for Responsible Lending has found that subprime lending over 
the last nine years will result in more foreclosures than it will create new first-
time homeowners.  This net loss in homeownership holds especially true for 
African-American and Latino borrowers.  For subprime originations made in 
2005, among African Americans and Latinos, [estimates are] that there will be 
84,000 more foreclosures than there will be first-time homeowners. 
Delvin Davis, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: The Impact of Subprime Foreclosures on African-
American and Latino Communities, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, 
Wash., D.C.), May/June 2007, at 12.  Estimates are that 
2.2 million families will lose or have lost their homes to foreclosure due to 
reckless subprime lending, including one out of every five subprime mortgages 
made in 2005 and 2006. . . .  [T]he losses associated with the 2.2 million 
completed foreclosures, if not averted, will total $265 billion in wealth lost by 
American families not facing foreclosure.
   
Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect Home Ownership and Provide Relief to 
Consumers in Financial Distress? (pt. I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 21 (2007), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/37978.PDF (emphasis omitted) (statement of Eric 
Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible Lending).  The losses from subprime lending 
exceeded $300 billion by the spring of 2008.  PAUL MUOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF 
BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS, at x (2008).  By then, 
approximately 1 million people had lost their homes, and it is predicted that, by the end of the 
decade, another 2 or 3 million will join them as subprime victims.  Id. 
25. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 189 (citing Franklin D. Raines, former CEO of Fannie Mae, 
and Edward Gramlich, a former Federal Reserve Board Governor); see infra Part IV. 
26. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: 
THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (2006), available 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/unfair-lending-the-effect-
of-race-and-ethnicity-on-the-price-of-subprime-mortgages.html; Manny Fernandez, Racial Disparity 
Found Among New Yorkers with High-Rate Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at B1 (discussing 
New York neighborhoods where subprime mortgages were common and those in which they were 
rare and stating ―that even when median income levels were comparable, home buyers in minority 
neighborhoods were more likely to get a loan from a subprime lender‖). 
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smaller down payments and poorer credit histories.
27
  More than three decades 
after the enactment of the major federal fair lending laws,
28
 black borrowers 
―continue to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the 
best terms that their credit history, income, and other individual financial 
considerations merit.‖29  The net result was that, generally, black borrowers 
purchased more expensive loans than their credit profiles qualified them for, 
as compared to whites with similar borrower characteristics.
30
  The number of 
blacks was disproportionate within the universe of consumers of subprime 
loans as compared with the percentage of blacks in the general population.
31
  
Because of racial discrimination in the home mortgage and refinance market, 
―people of color are more likely than whites with similar borrower 
characteristics to be victims of predatory lending, to receive higher cost loans, 
and to lose their homes to foreclosure.‖32  The foreclosure of these subprime 
loans will result in a net loss in home ownership in the black community and 
 
27. BOCIAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3; ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 25; Minority 
Subprime Borrowers, CONSUMERS UNION SWRO (Consumers Union, Austin, Tex.), Oct. 2002, at 3, 
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/au-minority-rpt.pdf.  The Consumers Union study 
analyzed Texas refinance loans between 1997 and 2000.  Id. at 1. 
28. ―Fair lending laws‖ frequently refers to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), and their implementing 
regulations.  Warren W. Traiger, New Fair Lending Initiatives, REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 
(Standard & Poor‘s, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 4, 1998, at 1 n.1, available at 
http://www.traigerlaw.com/publications/new_fair_lending_initiatives_the_review_of_banking_&_ 
financial_services_3_4_98.pdf.  The CRA was intended to encourage covered institutions to meet the 
credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities.  See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).  The Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) mandates that lenders provide the public with certain 
data pertaining to housing-related loans and loan applications.  See 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006).  The 
ECOA was enacted in 1974 to promote credit availability and prohibit creditors from discriminating 
based upon certain criteria, including race, color, or sex.  15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006).  Finally, the 1968 
FHA prohibits discrimination in housing-related transactions and housing financing based upon, 
among other things, race, color, or sex.  42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
29. Apgar & Calder, supra note 7, at 102; see also WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., HARVARD UNIV. 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, CREDIT, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
CHANGING MORTGAGE BANKING INDUSTRY FOR COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/communitydevelopment/ccc04-1.pdf. 
30. See ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 61; MICHAEL B. DE LEEUW ET AL., RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION AND HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLATIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 
at ii (2007), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files/ushrn/images/linkfiles/CERD/ 
17_Housing%20Discrimination.pdf. 
31. See infra Parts III and IV and accompanying text. 
32. DE LEEUW ET AL., supra note 30, at ii; see also APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 68 
(discussing the devastating ripple effects of foreclosure).  Foreclosure may undermine the ability of 
borrowers to engage in commercial markets—for example, by opening businesses—because of poor 
credit.  It may also make it more difficult for borrowers to maintain gainful employment by, for 
instance, making the cost of securing financing to purchase a car to drive to work too high for the 
borrower to afford.  Id. 
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will erode the property values of non-foreclosed homes.
33
 
The unhealthy growth in subprime lending began in the early 1990s and 
exploded in the late 1990s through 2006.
34
  Subprime lending is the practice 
of lending to borrowers who, theoretically,
35
 do not demonstrate eligibility 
under standard credit requirements.  The term ―subprime borrower‖ is not 
consistently defined by individual financial institutions or in the 
marketplace.
36
  The credit characteristics of subprime borrowers are varied 
and can include delinquencies, bankruptcies, judgments, charge-offs or other 
negative credit indicators, as well as limited financial resources.
37
  Lenders 
 
33. NAT‘L CMTY. REINV. COAL., INCOME IS NO SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN 
LENDING II: A COMPARISON OF HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA‘S METROPOLITAN AND RURAL 
AREAS 8 (2008); MAJORITY STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING 
CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES, AND HOW 
WE GOT HERE 9 (2007); Williams et al., supra note 6, at 188–89 (stating that, according to a 2004 
study, subprime loans ―contributed 28 times as much to neighborhood foreclosures as did prime 
loans‖).  But see Charles W. Calomiris et al., The Foreclosure–House Price Nexus: Lessons from the 
2007–2008 Housing Turmoil 25–26, (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14294, 
2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14294.pdf.  Calomiris et al. argue that foreclosures 
tend to have localized effects on housing prices and that those local effects tend to be less significant 
than many assume.  The authors control for national and statewide trends in building permit growth 
rates, employment growth rates, housing sale rates, single-family permits, and total house prices.  
After controlling for these trends, the effects of foreclosures, they conclude, are fairly minimal.  Id. 
34. Subprime refinance loans grew from 80,000 in 1993 to 790,000 by 1999.  ROSS & YINGER, 
supra note 19, at 19.  In 1994, subprime loans were fewer than 5% of all mortgage originations; their 
representation had grown to 13% by 1999.  Id.  
35. See infra Part III (suggesting that, even after controlling for property and borrower 
characteristics that are relevant to the lending decision, race is consistently a statistically significant 
factor in determining whether a borrower receives a subprime loan); see infra Part V (discussing 
evidence of intentional discrimination in lending based upon race). 
36. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,570 (July 10, 2007).  
Most federal agencies have incorporated the credit risk characteristics of subprime borrowers from 
the 2001 Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs.  Id. 
37. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXPANDED GUIDANCE 
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001). 
Generally, subprime borrowers will display a range of credit risk characteristics 
that may include one or more of the following: 
 Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more 
60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months;  
 Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months;  
 Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;  
 Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit 
bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the 
product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an 
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or 
 Debt service-to-income ratio of 50% or greater, or otherwise limited ability 
to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-service 
requirements from monthly income. 
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perceive subprime borrowers as higher credit risks than prime borrowers 
because of subprime borrowers‘ poorer credit characteristics.  Consequently, 
subprime loans are more expensive for borrowers than are prime loans and 
offer lenders a greater return to compensate for the increased risk associated 
with them.
38
 
There is a strong correlation between subprime lending and predatory 
lending, though certainly not all subprime loans are predatory and, in fact, 
some organizations make responsible subprime loans.
39
  Unlike subprime 
lending, predatory lending is never justified; it is fraught with abuse and 
perhaps even fraud.
40
  ―[A] loan is predatory if the lender knowingly extracts 
more surplus from the borrower than the loan delivers to the borrower.‖41  
Some common characteristics of predatory loans include (1) excessive fees 
and interest rates; (2) abusive prepayment penalties; (3) kickbacks to 
mortgage brokers in the form of yield spread premiums; (4) loan flipping; (5) 
loose qualifying standards on high-risk loans; (6) mandatory arbitration; and 
(7) steering and targeting.
42
  Generally, predatory lending practices manifest 
in one of two forms.
43
  First, predatory lending occurs when lenders extend 
 
Id. at 2–3. 
38. According to the risk/return tradeoff principle, high levels of risk or uncertainty are 
associated with high levels of return.  Low levels of risk or uncertainty are associated with low 
potential returns.  The terms risk and uncertainty are used synonymously.  See, e.g., Adam Borchert 
et al., Understanding Risk and Return, the CAPM, and the Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
(Dartmouth Tuck Sch. of Bus. Case & Teaching Paper Series, Case Note No. 03-111, 2003), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=481881 (discussing models for making the relationship between 
risk and return more precise and suggesting that investors should only be compensated for risk that 
cannot be ―diversified away‖). 
39. Three distinct mortgage markets exist: ―the prime market, the ‗legitimate‘ subprime market, 
and the predatory market.‖  APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 64.  Responsible subprime lending can 
expand the credit opportunities of black borrowers; however, lending institutions, their loan officers, 
and brokers must understand and attend to the unique risks that accompany subprime lending and 
refinancing.  ROSS & YINGER, supra note 19, at 19–20. 
40. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2044 (2007). 
41. Philip Bond et al., Predatory Lending in a Rational World 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., 
Working Paper No. 06-2, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875621. 
42. Fact Sheet, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Predatory Mortgage Lending Robs 
Homeowners & Devastates Communities, available at http://www.dupontfund.org/learning/ 
pdfs/predatory_mortgage_lending.pdf; Austin, supra note 5, at 1218; Howell E. Jackson & Laurie 
Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J. L. 
BUS. & FIN. 289, 296  (2007) (―[Y]ield spread premiums are not simply another form of mortgage 
broker compensation, but rather a unique form of compensation that allows mortgage brokers to 
extract excessive payments from many consumers.‖). 
43. See Bond et al., supra note 41, at 1 (―Predatory lending is associated with highly 
collateralized loans, inefficient rolling over of subprime loans, lending with disregard to ability to 
pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments and poorly informed borrowers.‖); see also JAMES H. 
CARR & LOPA KOLLURI, FANNIE MAE FOUND., PREDATORY LENDING: AN OVERVIEW 2, 
http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/article/relfiles/hot_topics/Carr-
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credit to borrowers on terms that are inconsistent with the amount of credit 
risk the lender is assuming.  Excessive fees and interest rates and prepayment 
penalties are examples of some of these types of terms.
44
  Second, predatory 
lending can be characterized by loans that are made without appropriate 
regard for the borrower‘s ability to repay.45 
The federal government has intervened at various points through 
regulation and legislation to address housing and mortgage lending 
discrimination.
46
  The intervention was often in response to pervasive 
discrimination by lenders and others involved in the insurance and lending 
sectors.  For example, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
47
 (CRA) 
was passed in response to concerns of redlining in lending.  Congress passed 
the CRA to encourage federally insured thrifts and banks to meet the credit 
needs of their entire communities, including minority households, consistent 
with safe and sound banking practices.
48
  Redlining,
49
 refusing to lend to 
 
Kolluri.pdf (suggesting that there are as many as three categories into which predatory loans typically 
may be cast): 
Generally speaking, three features—alone or in combination—define predatory 
lending practices.  Those features include targeted marketing to households on 
the basis of their race, ethnicity, age or gender or other personal characteristics 
unrelated to creditworthiness; unreasonable and unjustifiable loan terms; and 
outright fraudulent behavior that maximizes the destructive financial impact on 
consumers of inappropriate marketing strategies and loan provisions. 
Id. 
44. Bond et al., supra note 41, at 2. 
45. Id. 
46. See infra notes 47–48, 57 & 60 and accompanying text. 
47. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006). 
48. Id. § 2901(b). 
49. The practice of redlining dates back at least to the 1930s when the Home Owners‘ Loan 
Corporation mapped hundreds of cities to indicate the ―safe‖ areas for federal insurance of home 
loans.  The practice of redlining  
appears to have originated in 1935, when the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
asked the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation to create ―residential security 
maps‖ for 239 cities that would indicate the level of security for real estate 
investments in each surveyed city.  The resulting maps designated four 
categories of lending and investment risk, each with a letter and color 
designation.  Type ―D‖ areas, those considered to be the riskiest for lending and 
which included many neighborhoods with predominantly African-American 
populations, were color-coded red on the maps—hence the term ―redlining.‖  
Private lenders reportedly constructed similar maps that were used to determine 
credit availability and terms.  The 1961 Report on Housing by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights reported practices that included requiring high 
down payments and rapid amortization schedules for African-American 
borrowers as well as blanket refusals to lend in particular areas.   
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Community 
Affairs Research Conference, The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges 
2 (Mar. 30, 2007) (citations omitted), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
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borrowers in communities with high concentrations of minorities, reduced the 
amount of capital available in the redlined communities for home acquisition 
and improvement.
50
  Redlining reduced the supply of financing in targeted 
neighborhoods and therefore demand for these homes, resulting in a slower 
rate of home appreciation compared to non-targeted neighborhoods.
51
  
Existing homeowners in redlined communities had greater difficulty selling 
their homes and realizing the appreciated value that those in non-redlined 
neighborhoods experienced.  Redlining also made it more difficult for black 
borrowers to access credit to start or improve businesses.  The predictable 
outcome was that those in redlined areas have not only less access to credit 
but also lower incomes, lower credit scores, higher debt-to-value ratios, and 
lower home values.
52
 
While the CRA expanded access to credit and residential mortgages for 
many, it has not evolved to address changes in the financial market for 
subprime mortgages.  Most subprime mortgages are originated by 
nondepository institutions
53
 and packaged by mortgage brokers
54
 that are not 
covered by the CRA.
55
  Moreover, most subprime mortgage originators are 
not prime lenders, which is troubling for borrowers as ―subprime lending by 
prime lenders is probably less prone to abuse, since prime lenders also offer 
lower-cost products, work less with brokers, and are often subject to greater 
regulatory scrutiny.‖56 
Additionally, the Federal Fair Housing Act
57
 (FHA) was passed to 
prohibit discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions.  The 
 
speech/bernanke20070330a.htm. 
50. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516 (2005). 
51. See generally Williams et al., supra note 6, at 202 (discussing the consequences of housing 
segregation on blacks‘ access to networks of service providers and on their vulnerability to racial and 
economic targeting by lenders). 
52. See Barr, supra note 50, at 516 (―Economic theories predict that low-income communities 
generally would have lower access to capital than they would in a fully functioning market because 
of market failures, in addition to discrimination.‖). 
53. The term ―nondepository institutions‖ refers to financial institutions that extend credit to 
borrowers in the form of loans but that do not accept bank deposits.  Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Regional Economic Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/regional/definitions/nextpage.cfm?key= 
Nondepository%20institutions (last visited July 30, 2010). 
54. Mortgage brokers are loan intermediaries, or loan originators, who bring borrowers and 
lenders together.  Mortgage brokers do not fund the loan.  2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 11.1, at 76 (5th ed. 2007).  They have a significant role in 
the residential mortgage market.  The mortgage broker will take relevant information from the 
borrower, produce the necessary loan documents, and supervise the loan closing.  Id.  ―The loan will 
be closed in the lender‘s name, and the lender will underwrite, fund, and often service the loan.‖  Id. 
55. Bernanke, supra note 49, at 11–12; THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS, supra note 33, at 18. 
56. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 191. 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
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FHA covers many forms of housing discrimination and prohibits 
discrimination against individuals because of their race and other 
characteristics in the sale or rental of housing.
58
  The FHA makes it unlawful 
to discriminate in residential real estate-related transactions because of a 
borrower‘s race.  Such transactions include the provision of financial 
services.
59
 
Moreover, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
60
 (ECOA) prohibits creditors 
from discriminating against applicants in regards to a credit transaction on the 
basis of, among other things, the applicants‘ race, color, national origin, or 
marital status.  For example, under the ECOA, a creditor would be prohibited 
from ignoring the earnings of a female mortgage applicant when determining 
whether a family qualifies for a mortgage.
61
  Lenders historically discounted 
or ignored the earnings of female applicants, considering only the husband‘s 
or male applicant‘s income, and attributed their conduct to the inherent 
 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006): 
(a) In general— 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes 
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against 
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions 
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin.  
(b) ―Residential real estate-related transaction‖ defined— 
As used in this section, the term ―residential real estate-related transaction‖ 
means any of the following: 
(1) The making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial 
assistance—  
(A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a 
dwelling; or  
(B) secured by residential real estate. 
(2) The selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property. 
Id. 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006): 
(a) Activities constituting discrimination— 
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, 
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction—  
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, 
or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);  
(2) because all or part of the applicant‘s income derives from any public 
assistance program; or  
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under this 
chapter. 
Id. 
61. See id. 
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uncertainty attending women‘s commitment to remaining in the workforce 
because of the competing demands of motherhood and family rearing.
62
 
Despite these fair lending laws, discrimination by the financial services 
and insurance industries limited the access of black borrowers to housing and 
finance opportunities and segregated them into communities that were easy 
for lenders to target for disparate treatment with subprime loans.  These fair 
lending laws improved black borrowers‘ access to credit and capital, but those 
resources often are provided by subprime and predatory lenders. 
National leaders, in blind pursuit of the ―ownership society,‖63 led the 
country into a perilous housing trap too complex to understand for many 
caught in that trap, perhaps until it was too late.  Nationally, home ownership 
rates have steadily fallen since 2005, reaching a ten-year low in the first 
quarter of 2010.
64
  Many assumed that more lending and greater access to 
credit for black communities was desirable.
65
  But more lending is not the 
same as responsible lending, and these same communities that have been 
struggling to bridge the home ownership gap
66
 created by historical housing 
 
62. Federal Citizen Information Center, Consumer Handbook to Credit Protection Laws: 
Applying for Credit, http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/money/protectionlaws/apply.htm (last 
visited July 30, 2010). 
Both men and women are protected from discrimination based on gender 
or marital status.  But many of the law‘s provisions were designed to stop 
particular abuses that generally made it difficult for women to get credit.  For 
example, denying credit or offering less favorable credit terms based on the 
misperception that single women ignore their debts when they marry, or that a 
woman‘s income ―doesn‘t count‖ because she‘ll stop work to have and raise 
children, is unlawful in credit transactions. 
Id.  Black women, in particular, have been targets of subprime and predatory lenders.  This Article 
does not focus on the unique experiences of black women borrowers with subprime and predatory 
lending.  The issue of gender-based intentional discrimination will be addressed in my forthcoming 
article. 
63. In an October 2004 speech, George W. Bush said: ―‗We‘re creating . . . an ownership 
society in this country, where more Americans than ever will be able to open up their door where 
they live and say, welcome to my house, welcome to my piece of property.‘‖  Naomi Klein, 
Disowned by the Ownership Society, NATION, Feb. 18, 2008, at 10 (quoting President George W. 
Bush, Remarks to the National Association of Home Builders (Oct. 2, 2004), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041002-7.html).  
64. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the First 
Quarter 2010 tbls.4 & 4SA (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr110/ 
files/q110press.pdf. 
65. Contra APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 67 (―Increasing default and foreclosure rates have 
led many analysts to question whether the recent increase in low-income homeownership—built in 
part on the rapid growth of subprime lending—is sustainable or even desirable.‖). 
66. ―[I]f you own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country.  The more 
ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the more people have a vital 
stake in the future of this country.‖  President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Federation 
of Independent Businesses (June 17, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/06/20040617-7.html.  But see A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home 
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discrimination are finding that many of the gains previously made will be lost 
to foreclosures.
67
 
―[I]ndustry apologists frequently dismiss findings of disparate treatment 
[in mortgage lending] as simply the failure to distinguish ‗risk from race.‘‖68  
Evidence of pervasive disparate treatment of blacks across the home mortgage 
and refinance industry is very difficult to gather for several reasons.
69
  First, 
mortgage financing is a complex, multistage endeavor.  At each stage of the 
process, lenders can intentionally discriminate, and the discrimination can 
present differently in each stage.
70
  This Article focuses on the financing 
stage, which is toward the end of the process when black borrowers are more 
likely to be offered subprime loans than similarly situated white borrowers.
71
  
Discrimination at this stage deserves more attention from researchers and 
analysts. 
Second, evidence of disparate treatment because of race is difficult to 
gather because past discrimination has created disparities that exist along 
racial and ethnic lines within credit criteria that influence home mortgage and 
refinance lending.  There are many borrower characteristics other than race 
that may explain the higher incidence of subprime and predatory loans among 
black borrowers as compared to white borrowers.
72
  Discrimination that 
occurred elsewhere in the economy, as well as historic housing 
discrimination, has resulted in black borrowers generally having lower 
incomes, lower home values, poorer credit histories, and higher obligation-to-
asset ratios than whites.
73
  These are important borrower characteristics and a 
 
Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L. REV. 189 (2009) 
(challenging home ownership at the root and advocating for a renewed emphasis on affordable 
―affordability products‖). 
67. See, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 6, at 184.  Foreclosure can be devastating to 
individuals and to communities.  Decreases in property values brought on by neighborhood 
foreclosures and deterioration and abandoned properties can cause homeowners to lose wealth and 
can negatively impact their ability to repay home loans.  Id.  But see Calomiris et al., supra note 33, 
at i (―The impact of foreclosures on prices, while negative and significant, is quite small in 
magnitude.‖). 
68. Apgar & Calder, supra note 7, at 112 (citation omitted). 
69. See URBAN INST., MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
EVIDENCE 3–5, (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage_lending.pdf; Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 44 (1998) (discussing the points of 
potential discrimination during the loan process). 
70. Ladd, supra note 69, at 44. 
71. See infra Part IV.D. 
72. Bernanke, supra note 49, at 2–3; Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: 
Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 25 (1996). 
73. For example, on the 2000 Census, black homeowners reported a median home value of 
$80,600, while white homeowners reported a median home value of $122,800.  ROBERT L. 
BENNEFIELD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME VALUES: 2000, at 3 fig.4 (2003), 
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refusal to offer a prime loan based on the adverse nature of these 
characteristics would not, standing alone, evidence intentional home mortgage 
or refinancing discrimination.  Whether housing discrimination has reinvented 
itself in the subprime and predatory mortgage and refinance markets is 
important; equally important is the need to ensure that statistically significant 
gaps between blacks and whites in subprime and predatory lending are not 
mislabeled as the results of intentionally discriminatory lending practices 
when, in fact, they are attributable to borrower and neighborhood 
characteristics that could be properly considered in the lender‘s decision-
making process.  Thus, there is much debate regarding whether differentials in 
the quality of loan products exist because of legitimate, credit-related factors 
that may vary based upon the applicant‘s race and ethnicity or whether the 
differences are more directly correlated to race. 
Finally, the mortgage financing industry treats credit quality data, the 
information used to price loans, as proprietary and has resisted making this 
information available, which has effectively enabled the industry to 
undermine studies that find evidence of disparate treatment.
74
  For purposes of 
this Article, disparate treatment occurs when black borrowers with equal or 
better credit indicators than ―comparable‖ white borrowers receive less 
favorable loan terms or products than the white borrowers.  Overwhelming 
proof of disparate impact can compel an inquiry into discriminatory intent.  
And one can imagine evidence of disparate impact so prodigious in light of 
the surrounding facts, such as the likeness of white and black borrowers along 
all relevant lending criteria, that the only plausible explanation for the 
differences in treatment among the groups appears to be an intent to 
discriminate based upon race.  Against that history, both recent and ancient, 
regarding intentional and unintentional discrimination, we now turn to the 
evidence that subprime products disproportionately burden black borrowers. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF RACE: DISPARATE IMPACT EVIDENCE 
Numerous organizations have conducted studies of subprime lending to 
 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-20.pdf.  In addition, 24.9% of the black population 
lived under the poverty level, compared to 9.1% of the white population, while black per capita 
income ($14,437) was 60% of white per capital income ($23,918).  ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & JOHN 
ICELAND, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 1999 (2003), at 8 tbl.6, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-19.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://factfinder.census.gov (per capita income statistics generated on January 21, 2009 by Mirya 
Holman using American FactFinder). 
74. See, e.g., APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 69–70 (discussing regulators‘ reluctance to make 
lenders include certain data that would be helpful in assessing the appropriateness of a loan rate 
given a particular borrower‘s characteristics and discussing Congress‘s failure ―to adapt HMDA 
collection activities to reflect market trends‖); Editorial, Mortgages and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 2008, at A34. 
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determine if there is a discernable racial pattern in the marketing and 
acceptance of subprime loans.  Many of these studies, such as those discussed 
below, have concluded that racial patterns exist in subprime lending.  The 
studies are often localized, examining the impact of subprime lending on the 
borrowers of a particular city or state.  Therefore, these studies, by 
themselves, do not necessarily prove intentional racial discrimination.  Still, 
when combined with national studies that control for relevant borrower and 
property characteristics,
75
 it becomes increasingly difficult to explain away 
stark racial disparities between white and black borrowers in subprime 
lending as being unrelated to race. 
A 2007 study by New York University‘s Furman Center for Real Estate 
and Urban Policy considered racial differences in New York City 
neighborhoods when comparing the rates of subprime mortgages in those 
neighborhoods.  The researchers found that when median income levels 
between minority and non-minority neighborhoods were comparable, minority 
neighborhoods had more subprime mortgage homebuyers than non-minority 
neighborhoods.
76
  Data related to several key components of mortgage lending 
decisions—borrowers‘ assets, the amount of their debt and down payments, 
and their individual credit histories—were not included in the researchers‘ 
analysis.
77
  The absence of this information makes it more difficult to draw a 
direct conclusion that mortgage lenders were intentionally discriminating 
against minorities; however, coupled with data indicating that even at higher 
income levels black borrowers were significantly more likely than their white 
peers to receive subprime loans, the New York University study highlights 
national concern about the role of race in mortgage lending decisions.
78
 
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports, analyzed 
Texas refinance loans for the period of 1997 to 2000.
79
  Consumers Union 
concluded that its study 
reinforces (for Texas) the findings of several national studies: 
race matters.  The race/ethnicity of borrowers is a powerful 
factor in the penetration of subprime lending in Texas 
 
75. See infra Part IV.  Press Release, Or. Ctr. for Pub. Pol‘y, OCPP Finds Racial Pattern in 
Oregon‘s Subprime Lending (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.ocpp.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?page= 
nr080131subprime (discussing a 2006 study).  ―At all income levels, Oregon‘s African American . . . 
borrowers are more likely than whites to have received subprime loans . . . .‖  Id. (emphasis added).  
The OCPP was careful to note that its analysis, by itself, did not prove racial discrimination in 
lending, but that combined with other national data, the study uncovered inexplicable racial 
differences.  Id.  
76. Fernandez, supra note 26. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Minority Subprime Borrowers, supra note 27, at 1. 
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communities.  [The] study shows that subprime loans are 
concentrated in geographical areas with a higher 
concentration of minority residents.  Even after accounting 
for other factors, the likelihood of getting a subprime loan 
increases for minority borrowers, especially Black borrowers.  
Among higher income borrowers, the distinction between 
subprime lending to Whites and subprime lending to 
minorities is stark.
80
 
Consumers Union, noting that black borrowers statistically have fewer 
assets and earn less than white borrowers, which negatively affects their credit 
scores and loan underwriting, accounted for the impact of these factors on 
lending decisions by analyzing all Texas home purchases and refinances in 
which the borrowers earned more than 1.5 times the state‘s median income 
($60,000 or more annually) and borrowed less than 2.5 times their reported 
income.
81
  Consumers Union found that even at upper income levels, the rate 
of subprime financing and refinancing was highly correlated to race.  Upper 
income whites refinanced with subprime loans at the rate of 16.7% and upper 
income blacks at the rate of 46.4%.
82
 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Boston Fed) issued a report in 1996 
interpreting 1990 HMDA data analyzing mortgage lending in Boston, 
Massachusetts.
83
  In the report, the Boston Fed analyzed the mortgage denial 
rates of minorities versus non-minorities.  The report did not address the quality 
of mortgage loans, whether prime or subprime; however, that factor is probative 
in its analysis of whether race is a barrier to entrance into the mortgage market. 
HMDA was enacted by Congress in 1975 for the purpose of providing the 
public with loan data that could be used to aid (1) in discerning lending 
patterns that are discriminatory; (2) in verifying whether financial institutions 
covered by the legislation are serving their communities‘ housing needs; and 
(3) public officials as they attempt to distribute investments from the public 
sector in an effort to attract private investments to areas in need.
84
  As HMDA 
was originally enacted, the data required to be reported was very limited and 
this limitation has been a point of criticism in the debate regarding whether 
studies relying on HMDA data to reveal housing discrimination are reliable 
indicators.
85
 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 2. 
82. Id. 
83. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 25–26.  
84. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006); Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act, Background & Purpose, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history.htm (last 
visited July 31, 2010). 
85. ―HMDA data do not include information on credit histories, debt burdens, loan-to-value 
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HMDA was amended in 1989; the amendments expanded the coverage of 
HMDA‘s reporting requirements.86  The amendments required reporting of 
data pertaining to loan applications; prior to the amendments, institutions 
were required only to report data regarding loans that were purchased or 
originated.
87
  The 1989 amendments also required most covered institutions to 
report mortgage applicants‘ and borrowers‘ race, sex, and income, and to 
provide identifying information for the location of the property included in the 
application based upon 1990 Census data.
88
 
The 2002 amendments to HMDA regulations added additional reporting 
fields and added significantly to the public data required to be disclosed by 
mortgage lenders.
89
  For instance, the amended HMDA regulations required 
covered institutions to report the race, sex, and ethnicity of telephone 
applicants.
90
  Covered institutions also had to begin reporting data for loan 
pricing.  Loan originations for which the annual percentage rate exceeded the 
yield for comparable Treasury securities by three percentage points or more 
had to be reported.
91
  Lenders began reporting the new data pursuant to the 
2002 amendments in 2004, and the data was released to the public in 2005.
92
 
 
ratios, and other factors considered in making mortgage decisions . . . .‖  Munnell et al., supra note 
72, at 25; APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 56.  Critics argue that HMDA data fails to account for 
important variables—―the ‗left out variable problem‘‖—and that the omission of these important 
variables ―can bias the coefficients on race/ethnicity to the extent that the omitted variables are 
correlated with race.‖  Id. 
86. The 1989 HMDA amendments are contained in the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. XII, § 1211, 103 Stat. 
183, 524–26, which became effective on January 1, 1990.  See also Home Mortgage Disclosure, 54 
Fed. Reg. 51,356 (Dec. 15, 1989) (announcing Federal Reserve Board regulations implementing 
amendments to HMDA). 
87. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,356–57.  Since 1990, HMDA has reported 
on loans that were originated and purchased as well.  It includes data on applications that were 
approved but that were not accepted by lenders, as well as data concerning applications that were 
withdrawn or denied.  Since 1990, HMDA also has reported data on applications that were closed 
because the applicant did not complete the application process.  Id. at 51,365 (now codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 76 (2010)). 
88. Id.; Home Mortgage Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,853 (Nov. 26, 1991). 
89. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218, 43,223 (June 27, 2002) (now codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 77–78); see also Consumer Bankers Association, Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act Information Page, http://www.cbanet.org/government/content.cfm?mnitemnumber=& 
tnitemnumber=&itemnumber=1198&unitemnumber=&pf=1&snitemnumber= (last visited Aug. 1, 
2010). 
90. This portion of the 2002 amendments was made applicable as of January 1, 2003.  Home 
Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,218. 
91. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7241 (Feb. 15, 2002) (now codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 203 app. A at 78–79).  This requirement pertained to loans that were secured by a first lien.  
If the loan was secured by a second lien, the threshold was 5% or more above the comparable 
Treasury rate.  Id. 
92. Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,218; Consumer Bankers Association, supra 
note 89. 
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Lenders indicate that many variables, in addition to those that are reported 
under HMDA, are important in the lending process, including the stability of 
the applicant‘s income stream, credit history reports, credit projection reports, 
loan-to-value ratios, total debt obligations, obligation ratios, and net wealth.
93
  
These items are not captured under the HMDA reporting requirements;
94
 
however, the Boston Fed augmented the 1990 HMDA data to account for 
thirty-eight additional variables, including the ones mentioned above.
95
  These 
additional variables constituted virtually all of the lender‘s information set as 
captured in its loan application form, the lender‘s worksheet, and the credit 
report.
96
  Including the additional borrower data reduced the disparity between 
black and white denial rates from the eighteen percentage points originally 
reported to slightly over eight percentage points, still statistically and 
economically significant.
97
  Minority applicants with the same personal and 
property characteristics of white applicants had a rejection rate of 28% rather 
than the more favorable rate experienced by white applicants of 20%.
98
 
The Boston Fed accounted for differences in economic factors that 
support higher mortgage denial rates for blacks on non-discriminatory 
grounds.  These economic factors included disparities in net wealth, strength 
of credit histories, lower down payments, and fewer liquid assets.
99
  The 
Boston Fed tested the pervasiveness of possible race bias by questioning 
whether racial disparities in rejection rates were due to isolated discriminatory 
conduct by one or two institutions in contrast to a market-wide phenomenon 
of discrimination.
100
  Also, it assumed that lenders are driven by a desire to 
maximize profit and so it accounted for the possibility that the reason minority 
applicants were rejected at higher rates than non-minority applicants was 
because lenders, considering the economic characteristics of minority 
borrowers, simply judged their loans to be less profitable, a purely economic 
 
93. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 28. 
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  ―While lenders are required to report to the 
federal government such things as race, gender, census tract, amount of loan and income, they omit 
credit score data.  By guarding the single most important statistic used in making loans, the lenders 
have given themselves a ready shield against charges of discrimination.‖  Mortgages and Minorities, 
supra note 74. 
95. Munnell et al., supra note 72, at 28–30 (outlining the authors‘ survey). 
96. Id. at 28. 
97. Id. at 26. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 31. 
100. To distinguish market-wide discrimination from the isolated behavior of a select group of 
lenders serving minority populations, the Boston Fed divided its test sample into two groups, lenders 
that had the greatest number of minority loans and the remaining lenders.  Id. at 41.  The first group 
accounted for only 5% of the lending institutions but 50% of the minority applications.  Id.  
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decision.
101
 
After supplementing the HMDA data to consider additional borrower 
characteristics gathered by lenders in the application process, abstracting for 
discrimination found in other areas of the economy, evaluating the study 
results to discern the pervasiveness of the role of race across institutions, and 
critically analyzing the quality of the HMDA data (correcting for errors),
102
 
the Boston Fed reported that in the Boston area, race has a statistically 
significant effect on mortgage lending decisions.
103
  Moreover, the 
discrimination that the study revealed in the form of higher minority denial 
rates because of race was widespread across institution types and sizes.
104
 
It is evident that significant differences in acceptance rates for prime 
loans, explainable only by race,
105
 remain after accounting for legitimate 
borrower characteristics like wealth, income, credit history, and credit scores.  
The lending discrimination studies, audit reports, and data generated from 
HUD and HMDA information included in this Article pose important 
implications for inequality in housing and lending policy. 
In the 1990s, subprime lenders, who had previously represented a much 
smaller share of the home mortgage lending and refinance business, accessed 
the emerging market of borrowers and produced gains in home ownership at a 
faster rate than ever before.
106
  But, the progress these lenders apparently 
made in increasing home ownership among black borrowers is illusory.  Many 
black borrowers were able to become homeowners only as a result of 
accepting the price of inequality—higher interest rate loans with less desirable 
terms and even predatory characteristics—all of which increased the 
likelihood of default and foreclosure for this already vulnerable group.
107
  To 
the extent subprime lenders have succeeded in stealing borrowers away from 
prime lenders, the perceived gains in home ownership for black borrowers has 
come at a tremendous price.
108
 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF RACE ON BORROWING AND LENDING BEHAVIORS: 
1998, 2002, AND 2006 HMDA DATA 
This Part of the Article provides a new look at HMDA and HUD data for 
the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 to determine the impact of race on subprime 
 
101. Id. at 27, 41. 
102. Id. at 45–47. 
103. Id. at 47. 
104. Id. 
105. These differences are also explainable, in part, by gender.  See supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
106. See supra Part II. 
107. See id.; see also Williams et al., supra note 6, at 201. 
108. See supra Part II; see also Williams et al., supra note 6, at 201. 
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and predatory lending.  The first part of the study examines the national data 
to discern the borrowing behaviors of blacks and whites by determining the 
percentage of black and white borrowers by state who (1) applied for 
subprime loans and (2) were accepted for subprime loans by the lender.
109
  
The study results show that blacks typically apply for subprime loans and are 
accepted for subprime loans at higher rates than whites.
110
 
The second part of the study addresses the question of whether disparities 
in subprime rates between black and white borrowers exist because of or in 
spite of race.  This part of the study controls for relevant borrower, house, and 
neighborhood characteristics.
111
  Patterns similar to those in the first part of 
the study are revealed in the second part of the study.  Consistently, race has a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood a borrower receives a subprime 
loan.
112
  Black borrowers are more likely than white borrowers to receive a 
subprime loan even when other measures that are relevant to the loan decision 
are held constant between black and white borrowers. 
Section A contains a description of the data used to conduct difference of 
means tests, the first part of the study.
113
  Next, section B contains a 
description of the data used in the logit analyses, the second part of the study.  
The results of the difference of means test are presented in section C, and the 
results of the logit analyses are presented in section D. 
A.  State Data Means Test for Application and Acceptance for Subprime 
Loans Based upon Race—Methodology 
The primary data this study used to analyze the attributes of subprime 
lending broken down by race is from the 1998, 2002, and 2006 HMDA data 
sets.  The data sets contain information on every application for a home 
mortgage origination or refinance loan made in the United States for those 
years.  For each loan application, lenders were required to report borrower 
characteristics, including borrowers‘ race, gender, and income, as well as 
information on the house value and location.  In processing the data, HMDA 
removed identifying features
114
 and provided information on the 
neighborhood, census tract, or Metropolitan Statistical Area
115
 (MSA) in 
 
109. See infra Tables 1–3.  
110. Id. 
111. See infra Tables 4–6. 
112. Id. 
113. A difference of means test (t-test) compares the means of two groups on a single variable 
and uses standard errors to establish whether the means have a statistically significant difference.  
LES SEPLAKI, ATTORNEYS‘ DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 243 
(1991). 
114. Such as the house address. 
115. MSA is defined as an urban area containing a minimum of 50,000 inhabitants, including 
surrounding counties.   
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which the house is located.  The 1998 HMDA data set contains 11,000,077 
mortgage applications, the 2002 data set contains 14,198,111 mortgage 
applications, and the 2006 data set contains 21,735,287 mortgage 
applications.
116
  The HMDA data sets contain multiple applications for the 
same borrower, as each lender is required to log every application regardless 
of whether it is completed or leads to a lending decision.  All incomplete 
applications were removed from the data set for cleaning and streamlining 
purposes.  All applications where the borrower or co-borrower was black or 
white were identified.  Submitted applications in which neither the borrower 
nor the co-borrower were black or white were removed.
117
  The study begins 
by examining the 2006 HMDA data set, which also logs information on the 
lender, the borrower, the loan, and the house.  Due to state level fluctuations 
in home prices and lending practices, and for data management reasons, each 
state‘s lending patterns are modeled individually.  In addition, modeling the 
states separately eliminates the need to use a state fixed-effects model.
118
 
After cleaning this data, subprime loans were identified through two 
processes.  First, since 2004, HMDA has required lenders to report the rate of 
any loan where the annual percentage rate is three percentage points or more 
above the yield on a comparable Treasury security (Alternative Measure).
119
  
This is the first category of subprime loans, which is examined and identified 
in Table 4.  Using this data, loans that have a subprime rate can be identified 
through the HMDA data set.  The Treasury rate spread measure of subprime 
loans is not available for the 1998 and 2002 data.
120
 
Second, using the 2005 HUD list
121
 of subprime lenders, each lender that 
is listed by HUD as a subprime lender was marked (HUD-Classified 
Subprime Lender).
122
  HUD identified subprime lenders based upon the 
percentage of their overall loans that qualified as subprime.
123
  This is the 
 
116. All data on the number of applicants is from HMDA data and refers to the number of 
applications from white and black borrowers. 
117. This Article is concerned about the impact of subprime and predatory lending practices on 
black borrowers.  While evidence indicates that other minority groups may be experiencing negative 
impacts, the focus of this Article is on black borrowers as a class. 
118. A fixed-effects model would require a constant dummy variable for each state, which 
would greatly expand the size of each model and prevent me from examining state-by-state trends. 
119. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
120. This measure of subprime loans results from the amendments to HMDA regulations noted 
in Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7241 (Feb. 15, 2002) (now codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 203 app. A at 78–79) (amendments effective January 1, 2004).  Therefore, this measure of 
subprime loans is not available for data from the years 1998 and 2002. 
121. A one-year lag between the HUD subprime lender list and the HMDA data is acceptable 
and recommended by HUD. 
122. See HUD User Data Sets, supra note 13 (detailing how HUD classifies lenders as 
subprime). 
123. Id. 
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second category of subprime loans, which is examined and identified in 
Table 5. 
The first method of identifying subprime loans, by the Alternative 
Measure, will identify subprime loans given by prime lenders.  The second 
method of identifying subprime loans, through the HUD-Classified Subprime 
Lenders, focuses on lenders who routinely engage in subprime lending 
practices.
124
  These lenders include, but are not limited to, lenders whose loans 
are determined to be subprime because of their high interest rates.  Some 
loans are classified as subprime because of loan characteristics other than the 
interest rates, such as excess fees, prepayment penalties, interest-only loans, 
balloon payments, and other predatory lending practices.
125
 
The combination of these two methods of identifying subprime loans 
allows for a more thorough examination of the lending and borrowing 
behavior surrounding subprime lending.  Using both methods to identify 
subprime loans is important, as they capture different populations.  The 
Alternative Measure encompasses the loans that fit the standard definition of a 
subprime loan, regardless of whether they are given out by a prime or 
subprime lender.  As prime lenders frequently lend money at subprime rates, 
it is important to look at those loans.  The HUD-Classified Subprime Lender 
method allows the incorporation of all the loans that are given out by 
subprime lenders, regardless of whether the rate itself is subprime.  This 
allows the inclusion of loans that may not have a high rate but fit other 
 
124. Id. 
HUD uses a number of HMDA indicators to identify potential subprime 
lender specialists.  First, subprime lenders typically have lower origination rates 
than prime lenders.  Second, home refinance loans generally account for higher 
shares of subprime lenders‘ total originations than prime lenders‘ originations.  
Third, lenders who sell a significant percentage of their portfolios to the 
[government-sponsored enterprises] do not typically specialize in subprime 
lending.  The rate spread variable available for the first time with the 2004 
HMDA data can also be used as a screen to identify potential subprime lender 
specialists.  As would be expected, the ranking of potential subprime lenders 
using the HUD indicators is very similar to the ranking of potential subprime 
lenders using the rate spread premium variable alone. 
HUD called the lenders identified on the potential list or reviewed their 
web pages to determine if they specialized in subprime lending.  A large 
number of lenders told us that they offer subprime loans but they do not 
constitute a large percentage of their overall conventional mortgage 
originations.  Most lenders readily identified themselves as prime or subprime 
lender specialists.  Some lenders identified themselves as all-purpose lenders 
and broke out their loan portfolios by mortgage product.  In a couple of cases, 
we identified a lender as subprime if their subprime percentage exceeded 
50 percent. 
Id.  
125. See id. 
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criteria, such as excessive fees, adjustable rate mortgages, and interest-only 
mortgages where the annual percentage rate is not three percentage points or 
more above the yield for comparable Treasury securities, but for which a 
closer examination might reveal that the paid rate is much higher than the 
initial rate.  The results of this study are displayed in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
B.  State Data Control Test Using Probability of Acceptance for a Subprime 
Loan as the Dependent Variable with Race as the Primary Independent 
Variable—Methodology 
Again, using HMDA data for the years 1998, 2002, and 2006, the study 
applies an alternate method to investigate the relationship between race and 
subprime loans—logit analysis.126  First, a dichotomous dependent variable 
was generated for the analysis, which labels a prime loan as ―0‖ and a 
subprime loan as ―1.‖  Using the variable generated, whether someone was 
accepted for a subprime loan,
127
 the following information was regressed:
128
 
the applicant‘s race; the applicant‘s income; the house value; characteristics of 
the area where the house is located, including the median income, the percent 
of houses that are owner-occupied, the percent of the census tract that are 
minorities, and the median income of the MSA.
129
  The results of this analysis 
are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
C.  State Data Means Test for Application and Acceptance for Subprime 
Loans Based upon Race—Findings 
Consistently in 2006, in every state, blacks applied for loans from 
subprime lenders more frequently than whites.  In every state except for North 
Dakota, there was a statistically significant difference between the rate of 
subprime applications for white and black borrowers.  The rates of subprime 
 
126. Logit analysis is a statistical technique when there are dichotomous dependent variables 
(e.g., whether a borrower applied for a subprime or a prime loan). 
127. The study used two measures of subprime loan applications; the first is the measure from 
HMDA, which requires that lenders report the rate of any loan that is lent at an annual percentage 
rate three points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities (Alternative Measure).  
See HUD User Data Sets, supra note 13 (explaining the methodology behind HUD‘s list).  The 
second measure uses data from HUD on subprime lenders (HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders).  Id.  
HUD has routinely identified lenders that it classifies as ―subprime‖ from their lending patterns.  Id. 
128. Through regression, this methodology attempts to estimate the relationship between each 
of these independent variables and the dependent variable (i.e., the probability of receiving a loan 
from a subprime lender). 
129. The study also separated out whether someone was accepted for a subprime refinance or a 
subprime origination loan.  These results are remarkably similar to the results presented in Tables 4, 
5, and 6, given that whether the applicant is black has a substantive and significant effect on whether 
the applicant is accepted for a subprime loan.  Generally, race has a larger effect on subprime 
origination loans than on subprime refinance loans (up to three times the effect size), but has a 
statistically significant effect in both instances in every state but Hawaii, North and South Dakota, 
and Montana.  
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applications for 2006, along with standard errors and probability values, are 
available in Table 1.
130
 
Next, the study examines the percentage of borrowers accepted for loans 
by subprime lenders.  Again, the differences between black and white 
borrowers are striking.  For the majority of states, black borrowers qualified 
for subprime loans at an average of 2.325 times the rate that white borrowers 
qualified for subprime loans.  The difference in rates ranges from 6.6% of 
white borrowers and 4.3% of black borrowers qualifying in South Dakota to 
6% of white borrowers and 20.8% of black borrowers qualifying in 
Washington, D.C.
131
 
As an alternate measure of subprime lending, the study examines the rates 
of approval for loans that were three percentage points or more above the 
yield on comparable Treasury securities (Alternative Measure).  The last three 
columns of Table 1 indicate that black borrowers were much more likely to 
borrow at a rate that was considered ―subprime,‖ in that the rate exceeded the 
annual percentage rate for comparable treasury securities by at least three 
percentage points.  Again, the only places where this pattern does not hold 
true are North Dakota and South Dakota, both of which have very low black 
populations. 
An analysis of two extreme states, North Dakota and Massachusetts, 
illustrates the disparate impact of these loans on white and black 
communities.
132
  In 2006 in North Dakota, there were 144 black loan 
applicants, 17.4% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime 
Lenders.  During the same year, there were 27,021 white applicants, 14.2% of 
whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders.  The 
acceptance rates did not vary in a statistically significant way based upon 
race.  Of the black applicants, 9.9% were accepted for loans from subprime 
lenders, compared to 7.7% of white applicants.  Considering the Alternative 
Measure, 16.8% of black applicants received loans that were three percentage 
points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities, compared 
to 17% of white applicants.  None of these differences are statistically 
significant, suggesting that white and black borrowers in North Dakota had an 
equal chance of applying for or being accepted for a subprime loan. 
The findings for North Dakota sharply contrast the findings for 
Massachusetts.  In Massachusetts in 2006, there were 38,055 black applicants 
 
130. Tables 2 and 3 contain information for years 2002 and 1998, respectively. 
131. See infra Table 1; South Dakota is the only state where the rate of white borrowers 
qualifying for subprime loans is greater than black borrowers.  This may be due to state-level 
differences in laws governing subprime lending or due to the fact that the black population in South 
Dakota is so small; the number of subprime black borrowers in South Dakota is 51.  
132. See infra Table 1.  
2010] RACE TO THE SUBPRIME 933 
applying for loans, 36.5% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified 
Subprime Lenders.  During the same year, there were 420,222 white 
applicants, 18.3% of whom applied for loans with HUD-Classified Subprime 
Lenders.  The acceptance rates varied in a statistically significant way based 
upon race.  Of the black applicants, 32% were accepted for loans from HUD-
Classified Subprime Lenders; 11.4% of the white applicants were accepted for 
loans from HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders.  Considering the Alternative 
Measure, 37.3% of black applicants received loans that were three percentage 
points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury securities, compared 
to 15.8% of white applicants.  All of these differences are statistically 
significant to the 0.000 level.  In general, the borrower and lender behavior in 
Massachusetts is closer than behavior in North Dakota to the 2006 national 
norm: black borrowers applied for subprime loans at a higher rate and were 
accepted for these loans at a much higher rate than were white borrowers. 
The results from 2002 and 1998 are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
133
  The 
number of subprime applications and of subprime loans was lower in 2002 
and 1998 than in 2006.
134
  In addition, the same pattern that was evident in 
2006 was evident in the 2002 and 1998 data—black applicants applied for and 
received subprime loans at higher rates than white applicants, albeit at lower 
rates than in 2006.  However, the difference between the racial groups was 
smaller in 2002 and 1998 than in 2006, resulting in some statistical 
insignificance.
135
 
As Figures 1 and 2 show, in the years 1998, 2002, and 2006 there has 
been a general rise in the number of subprime loans, the share of subprime 
loans in the overall lending market, and the racial disparity in applying for and 
receiving subprime loans.  This suggests that, while the effect of subprime 
lending has long been felt by a subset of borrowers, the last ten years have 
seen a significant increase in the disparate impact on black borrowers. 
D.  State Data Control Tests, Using Probability of Acceptance for a Subprime 
Loan as the Dependent Variable with Race as the Primary Independent 
Variable—Findings 
Table 4 contains the results for 2006, which show that in the large 
 
133. For simplicity‘s sake, all the state-level data was collapsed into a single file to assess the 
nature of subprime lending in the United States.  In 2006, the disparate patterns of subprime lending 
across states required either fixed-effects modeling or modeling each state individually.  In 2002 and 
1998, the number of subprime borrowers and lenders was low enough to collapse states together and 
estimate national effects. 
134. See infra Tables 1–3. 
135. All the differences between white and black borrowers are statistically significant except 
for the difference between the number of loans originated with subprime lenders by black and white 
borrowers in 1998. 
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majority of states, whether the applicant was black (versus white) had a 
positive, statistically significant effect on whether a lender approved a 
subprime loan, as determined by the Alternative Measure.  The only states 
where being black did not have a positive, statistically significant effect on 
whether the applicant was approved for a subprime loan were states with 
smaller black populations, such as Hawaii, North and South Dakota, and 
Montana.
136
  The effect size
137
 of the black variable ranged from 0.014 to 
0.543.
138
  Other variables move in and out of significance.  The amount of the 
loan, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, the income of the borrower, 
and the HUD median family income have very small coefficients and are 
routinely significant.  The percentage of the census tract comprised of 
minorities does not have a consistent effect.
139
 
The amount of the loan has consistently negative coefficients, meaning 
that as the size of the loan increased, the probability that the loan was 
subprime decreased.
140
  The Alternative Measure of subprime lending 
contains more borrowers than are contained in the HUD-Classified Subprime 
Lenders measure of subprime lending.
141
  The negative relationship between 
 
136. Due to the multiple log function of logit analysis, the methodology requires a fairly even 
distribution of data between the key variables.  As such, I was unable to run the analysis for several 
states that either had too few observations (e.g., North and South Dakota) or had substantial outliers 
for some of the variables.  This is largely for the effects reported in Table 5, where the dependent 
variable is whether a borrower received a loan from a subprime lender.  More results are available in 
Table 4, where the dependent variable is whether a borrower received a loan that is three points or 
more above the comparable Treasury rate, as there are larger numbers of borrowers under this 
criterion of subprime lending.  
137. Effect size measures the strength of the relationship between two variables, in this case the 
probability of being accepted for a subprime loan and the applicant‘s/ borrower‘s race.  The effect 
size for Washington, D.C., is larger (0.775), and while the study shows the results, the District is not 
included with the state data because it is not a state. 
138. As logit is used as the method (because of the non-linearity of the dependent variable), 
these results represent changes in probability and cannot be interpreted as direct effect sizes. 
139. This suggests that while the amount of the loan, the percentage of owner-occupied 
housing, the income of the borrower, and the HUD median family income all have a statistically 
significant relationship, there is little substantive relationship between these variables and the 
dependent variable.  For example, in Alaska, the percentage of the census tract that consists of 
minorities has a significant, negative effect on the probability that an individual will receive a loan 
from a subprime lender.  However, when the substantive effect is examined, we see that the effect (in 
Alaska) is -0.001, or a percent increase in the minority population of the census tract decreases the 
odds of getting a subprime loan by one tenth of one percent.  A 100% increase in the minority 
population would lead to a 10% decrease in the odds of getting a subprime loan.  This may be 
counterintuitive, as the extant literature and this research suggest that minorities bear the brunt of the 
subprime mortgage market.  It is important to note that the direction of this variable is inconsistent, 
suggesting that the relationship between percentage of minority population and probability of 
receiving a subprime loan may be based on other local characteristics.  This variable may be picking 
up variations in affluence amongst minorities in various states, for example. 
140. See infra Table 4. 
141. See infra Table 1 (percentage of loan applicants accepted at HUD-Classified Subprime 
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the loan amount and the likelihood that a borrower receives a subprime loan 
could be capturing wealthier borrowers with positive borrower characteristics 
who are applying for and receiving larger loans at prime loan rates. 
The median income of the MSA has a similar directionality; as the income 
of the borrower increases, the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan 
decreases.
142
  This finding reinforces the explanation for the inverse 
relationship between the loan amount and the probability of receiving a 
subprime loan. 
Table 4 analyzes the effect of the primary independent variable (race of 
the applicant) and the secondary independent variables
143
 on the probability 
that an individual will receive a subprime loan, as defined by the Alternative 
Measure.  Massachusetts will be used in this discussion to illustrate the data.  
As with the HUD-Classified Subprime Lenders, the applicant‘s race (being 
black versus being white) has a statistically and substantively significant 
effect on the probability that a borrower will obtain a loan from a subprime 
lender.  This variable has a coefficient of 0.401, which can be interpreted as a 
log-odds ratio.
144
  Calculated as a change in the probability of receiving a 
subprime loan, borrowers, if all other variables are held at their mean, see a 
3.3-percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a subprime loan.  
While this may appear low, it is important to remember that, as displayed in 
Table 1, only 11.4% of white borrowers receive subprime loans.  Thus, an 
increase in probability of 3.3 percentage points is more than a 25% increase in 
the probability that an individual receives a subprime loan, simply based on 
that individual‘s race. 
Table 5 reveals similar patterns: blacks are more likely than whites to be 
accepted for a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender.  Here, again, 
race has a positive effect and is statistically significant, meaning that black 
applicants are more likely to be approved for a loan from a subprime lender 
than are white applicants when income, house values, median income, 
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of the census tract that are 
minorities, and MSA median income are held constant.  The effect size ranges 
from 0.232 to 1.067.  As with the Alternative Measure of subprime loans, the 
amount of the loan, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, the income of 
 
Lenders compared to the percentage of loans classified by the Alternative Measure). 
142. See infra Table 4 (median income of MSA).  For example, in Alaska, the median income 
of the MSA has a significant, negative effect on the probability that a borrower will receive a 
subprime loan, as defined by the Alternative Measure.  The effect is -0.003, or a $1,000 increase in 
the median income of the MSA decreases the odds of getting a subprime loan by three tenths of 
one percent.
 
143. These variables are loan amount, borrower income, HUD income, median income for the 
MSA, percentage of owner-occupied housing, and the minority composition of the census tract. 
144. See infra p. 937. 
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the borrower, and the HUD median family income have very small effect 
sizes and are routinely significant. 
Interestingly, the effect size on the amount of the loan is positive (but 
small in size), suggesting that as the size of the loan goes up, borrowers are 
more likely to go to a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender.  This is in contrast 
to the results for the Alternative Measure of subprime lenders.
145
  This 
difference suggests that these two measures are capturing varying borrower 
and lender behavior, particularly among those applying for larger loans.  As 
stated earlier, the finding that an increase in the loan amount leads to a lower 
probability of receiving a subprime rate (the Alternative Measure) could 
reflect other positive borrower characteristics such as stable credit history, 
low income-to-debt ratio, high credit scores, and substantial down 
payments.
146
  However, the positive relationship between loan amount and 
borrowing from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender suggests that those 
borrowing at higher loan amounts may seek out subprime lenders who are 
willing to make larger and potentially riskier loans.  It may also be that these 
borrowers receive a prime rate from a subprime lender.  The median income 
of the MSA has a negative effect, while the percentage of the population that 
is minority has, again, an inconsistent effect. 
It is helpful to continue to use Massachusetts as an example for purposes of 
analyzing the data contained in Tables 4 and 5.  Table 5 allows one to estimate 
the probability that a borrower will receive a subprime loan (versus a prime 
loan) through logistical regression analysis, using the HUD-Classified 
Subprime Lender measure.  In Massachusetts, all the control variables are 
significant, suggesting that neighborhood characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, and borrower race are all indicators of whether an applicant 
receives a subprime loan.  Looking across the data, the first variable is black, 
which is a dummy variable representing the borrower‘s race.  A ―0‖ indicates 
that the applicant is white, while a ―1‖ indicates that the applicant is black.  
This variable is significant, and its impact is fairly large.  Logistical regression 
requires that one be very careful in interpreting the substantive effects of these 
results.  Dummy variable coefficients in logistical regression should be 
interpreted as log-odds ratios, or the ratio of the odds of receiving the subprime 
loan (versus receiving the prime loan) between the two groups (blacks and 
whites).  Here, being black (versus white) means that a borrower has a ten-
percentage-point greater likelihood of receiving a subprime loan.  The amount 
of the loan is positive, suggesting that as the amount requested increases, so 
too does the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan.  The minority population 
variable is positive, meaning that as the percentage of the minority population 
 
145. See supra notes 140–41. 
146. See supra note 77. 
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increases, so too does the probability of receiving a subprime loan.  The 
substantive effect of the minority population variable is that for every 
percentage-point increase in the minority population in the census tract, the 
probability of receiving a subprime loan increases by one-half of a percentage 
point.  The median income of the MSA is negative, meaning that an inverse 
relationship exists—an increase in the median income of the MSA leads to a 
decrease in the probability of receiving a subprime loan.
147
  The income of the 
individual is also negative, suggesting that as the applicant‘s income increases, 
the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan goes down.
148
 
The control data from 1998 and 2002 is presented in Table 6.  
Additionally, Table 6 contains a composite of the data from Table 5 for 
purposes of comparing the data for these three years, particularly examining 
the impact of race on the same variable over time (HUD-Classified Subprime 
Lender).
149
  The race of the borrower is statistically significant and positive, 
indicating that black borrowers are more likely to receive subprime loans than 
white borrowers.  The loan amount, median income of the census tract, and 
percentage of housing that is owner-occupied all have negative coefficients, 
indicating that these variables cause the probability of receiving a loan from a 
subprime lender to decrease.  The HUD income variable is insignificant in 
2002, and is marginally negative
150
 in 1998.  Income is significant and 
negative, indicating that as the income of the applicant rises, the probability of 
receiving a subprime loan decreases.  For all the variables, the relationship 
between neighborhood and objective borrower characteristics and the 
probability of receiving a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender 
decreased in substantive effect from 1998 to 2002, while the effect of race 
rose in substantive effect. 
Statistics can never prove intent; intent reflects an actor‘s state of mind.  
All statistics can do, at most, is reveal overall patterns and demonstrate 
relationships between, in this case, borrower characteristics and lending and 
borrowing behavior.  However, in this case, statistical analysis has shown that 
many of the traditional explanations for placing a borrower in a subprime loan 
are either (1) not statistically significant or (2) insufficient in explaining the 
 
147. The substantive effect of this variable is reasonably large, with an odds ratio of just over 1%.  
148. The HUD income is also significant, although there is very little substantive effect, with a 
coefficient near zero.  The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied is 
significant, with a coefficient also near zero. 
149. As with Tables 2 and 3, I combined the state-by-state effects into a single, national model, 
which allowed me to evaluate the changes in effect over time.  In addition, many of the states with 
very low black populations did not have enough observations to permit logit analysis.  By combining 
the states and using state fixed effects (inserting a dummy variable for each state), I was able to 
evaluate the effect of race on subprime lending.  
150. The variable is statistically significant but the effect size is substantively insignificant. 
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disparate rate of subprime lending to black and white borrowers.  When the 
reasons for placing a borrower in a subprime loan were controlled (like 
borrower income, cost of the loan, and neighborhood characteristics), race 
continued to be significant.  That is, being a black borrower consistently 
resulted in a higher probability of receiving a loan from a subprime lender, 
regardless of the borrower‘s income or where the house was located.151 
Analyzing Table 6 in depth, it is clear that, first, the baseline
152
 has been 
growing in size (becoming less negative) since 1998.  This indicates that the 
overall probability of receiving a loan from a subprime lender has grown since 
1998.
153
  Looking generally at the results, Table 6 shows that neighborhood 
and house characteristics (including median income of the MSA, percentage 
of owner-occupied housing and HUD income) all have declined in their 
substantive effect on the probability of receiving a loan from a subprime 
lender.  Essentially, those who argue that subprime loans are going primarily 
to bad neighborhoods may have been right at some point, but their argument 
grows weaker over time, as we move toward 2006.  Next, looking at borrower 
characteristics, the study shows that both the loan amount and the borrower‘s 
income have also declined in substantive effect from 1998 to 2002 to 2006; 
however, the substantive effect of the borrower‘s race grew (in each of the 
years 1998, 2002, and 2006), suggesting that black borrowers are bearing the 
true brunt of the subprime market.  Taken together, this suggests that at the 
beginning of the subprime lending crisis, subprime lenders focused on 
relevant borrower and property characteristics.
154
  Over time, lenders focused 
less on these legitimate characteristics and instead focused more on the race of 
the borrower. 
V.  THE IMPACT OF RACE: EVIDENCE OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATORY 
TREATMENT 
In fashioning a solution or response to the dilemma currently faced by 
many black borrowers, it is important to discern the source of the 
discrimination.  The legal and policy response to unconscious discrimination 
by lenders against black borrowers might, and arguably ought to, be different 
from the legal and policy response to conscious and targeted discrimination.  
 
151. See infra Table 6. 
152. See id. (column labeled ―Constant‖). 
153. In 1998, the log odds that a borrower would receive a subprime loan from a subprime 
lender was -234%.  In 2002, the log odds increased to -189% and increased again to -65% in 2006.  
Essentially, this means that a borrower, starting off, regardless of borrower or property 
characteristics, was much more likely to receive a loan from a subprime lender in 2006 than in 1998 
or 2002. 
154. Such characteristics include loan amount, borrower income, median income of the MSA, 
and percentage of owner-occupied housing in the census tract. 
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A failure to accurately identify the nature of the discrimination that black 
borrowers face in the home mortgage and refinance markets could condemn 
black borrowers to re-experience this current housing predicament, or a 
closely analogous one, across time and across products. 
As housing law advocates and scholars know, demonstrating 
discriminatory intent in this area of the law can be quite challenging.
155
  Direct 
evidence of housing discrimination is rare and corroboration is even more 
difficult to establish.
156
  The difficulty in proving intentional discrimination 
makes the conduct enticing and difficult to eliminate and creates a perfect 
breeding ground for the misconduct.  The challenge with using direct 
examples of discriminatory intent is that without extremely large volumes of 
such evidence, what might appear collectively to be market-wide race 
discrimination could reflect only the isolated actions of a very few brokers or 
lenders who are active in the market of black borrowers.  The challenge in 
proving that the overrepresentation of black borrowers in the subprime and 
predatory markets results from intentional discrimination does not mean that 
intentional discrimination is not in fact the cause.  Discrimination based in 
prejudice has always been challenging to establish, but the importance of 
doing so from a remedial and accountability standpoint necessitates that one 
not be timid in addressing the issue. 
Disparate impact evidence alone and in isolated instances is not sufficient 
to establish a strong correlation to discriminatory intent.  The overwhelming 
representation of blacks in the subprime market compared to similarly situated 
white borrowers—after comparing borrowers with equivalent credit 
indicators, and in the absence of any explanation other than race—should be 
sufficient to establish a cognizable claim of targeting and of intentional 
discrimination.
157
  Certainly, evidence of discriminatory intent is helpful in 
making the case and this evidence is available, though not in the same 
abundance as statistical evidence of disparate impact.  Making the case for the 
impact of race across many financial institutions approaches the impossible 
 
155. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 
(1977) (argued pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment):  
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially 
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the 
challenged decision.  Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village 
the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had 
the impermissible purpose not been considered. 
Id. 
156. Stanley D. Longhofer, Cultural Affinity and Mortgage Discrimination, 32 FED. RES. 
BANK OF CLEV. ECON. REV. 12, 16 (1996), available at http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/ 
1996/96-q3-longhofer.pdf. 
157. See supra Part IV. 
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unless one is willing to accept not only direct evidence in the form of affidavit 
statements, express market materials, and other forms of confession, but also 
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from quality data, national and 
local, pertaining to the subject. 
Gail Kubiniec, a former CitiFinancial loan officer testified about her 
subprime mortgage marketing practices.  ―‗If someone appeared uneducated, 
inarticulate, was a minority, or was particularly old or young, I would try to 
include all the [insurance] coverages CitiFinancial offered.‘‖158  CitiFinancial 
is a part of Citigroup Inc.  In response to criticism about its lending practices, 
Citigroup agreed to send out minority and non-minority auditors posing as 
CitiFinancial customers to its consumer finance branches from December 
2000 through January 2001 to evaluate their fair lending compliance 
practices.  The effectiveness of the ―Mystery Shopper‖ program was criticized 
under allegations that Citigroup sent a memorandum to certain CitiFinancial 
branches and districts providing advance notice of the tests.
159
 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in McGlawn v. Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission
160
 affirmed a finding of reverse redlining by the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the Commission) against 
McGlawn and McGlawn (McGlawn), a black-owned mortgage broker 
company.  To establish a claim of reverse redlining, the plaintiffs first bore 
the burden of demonstrating that the loan terms and lending practices of the 
defendant were unfair and predatory.
161
  Second, the plaintiffs had to 
demonstrate that the defendants intentionally targeted them based upon their 
race or that they experienced a disparate impact, again based upon their 
race.
162
 
The plaintiffs, also black, alleged that McGlawn discriminated against 
them because of their race and because of the racial composition of their 
predominantly black neighborhoods.  The Commission, in reaching its 
determination on the first element that the loan terms were unfair and 
predatory, relied in part upon expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs ―that, 
even assuming a borrower is an enhanced credit risk, the difference in interest 
rates between a sub-prime and prime market loan is usually no greater than 
three percentage points.  Anything higher than a three-point difference is 
 
158. Paul Beckett, Citigroup’s ―Subprime‖ Reforms Questioned, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at 
C1 (alteration in original); see also Austin, supra note 5, at 1219 (delineating women, the elderly, the 
poor and minorities as examples of consumers targeted by predatory lenders because of their 
perceived vulnerabilities).   
159. Citigroup Inc., 88 Fed. Res. Bull. 485, 497 n.70 (2002); Beckett, supra note 158. 
160. 891 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 906 A.2d 545 (Pa. 2006). 
161. Id. at 767. 
162. Id. at 772. 
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indicative of a predatory loan.‖163  The expert likely relied upon the HMDA 
definition of higher priced loans in reaching its conclusion.  ―Under HMDA, a 
loan is deemed to be higher-cost if the annual percentage rate exceeds the rate 
on the treasury security of corresponding maturity by 3% for a first 
lien . . . .‖164 
Next, the Commission found, and the court affirmed, that McGlawn 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs.
165
  The Commission also 
found substantial statistical evidence of disparate impact, which the court 
affirmed.
166
  According to the Commission, McGlawn ―engaged in an 
aggressive marketing plan targeting [blacks] and [black] neighborhoods in the 
Philadelphia area.‖167  McGlawn admitted to advertising extensively in print, 
radio, and television media and that many of the sources in which it chose to 
advertise were ―oriented toward [black] audiences and readers.‖168  The 
plaintiffs testified that they contacted the defendant because of its 
advertisements and that their decision to contact the defendant ―was 
influenced by the fact that it was [a black] company.‖169  Part of McGlawn‘s 
advertising strategy was to market itself as one of Philadelphia‘s ―‗first 
[black] owned and operated Mortgage and Insurance Financial Services 
[companies].‘‖170  Essentially, McGlawn emphasized its cultural affinity with 
the black borrowers it targeted and, at least in this instance, benefited from 
that affinity.
171
 
Relatedly, the court in M & T Mortgage Corp. v. Foy
172
 held that a 
rebuttable presumption of illegal and discriminatory loan practice arises when 
a lender grants a mortgage to a minority borrower to purchase property in a 
minority area if the loan‘s interest rate exceeds three percentage points above 
the comparable Treasury rate.  The plaintiff sued to foreclose its mortgage; 
the court found that the defendant, a black woman, may have been a victim of 
reverse redlining, and after finding that the interest rate on the defendant‘s 
mortgage was in excess of 3% above the comparable reasury rate, the court 
 
163. Id. at 770 (internal citation omitted). 
164. Subprime Mortgages and Foreclosures in New York: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Banks, N.Y. State Senate, 2007 Leg. (N.Y. 2007) (statement of Richard H. Neiman, Superintendent 
of Banks, N.Y. State Banking Department), available at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/ 
sp071213.htm. 
165. McGlawn, 891 A.2d at 773. 
166. Id. at 772–73. 
167. Id. at 764. 
168. Id. at 772. 
169. Id. at 773. 
170. Id. at 772. 
171. See infra Part VI (discussing cultural affinity). 
172. 858 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (relying on the HMDA definition of a higher 
priced loan). 
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held that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the loan was not ―the 
product of discriminatory practices.‖173 
In 2006, HUD conciliated a case in which a black couple filed a complaint 
against First Franklin Financial Bank and Primary Residential Mortgage.
174
  
The complainants alleged that though they attempted to purchase a home with 
a fixed-rate mortgage, the lender, because of their race, switched the mortgage 
loan to an adjustable rate mortgage containing a prepayment penalty and that 
the lender also added an additional $4,000 in closing costs.  The parties 
entered into a voluntary conciliation agreement.
175
  The lender paid the 
complainants $4,000, waived both the closing costs and the prepayment 
penalty, and provided a new fixed-rate mortgage.
176
  The lender also agreed to 
implement Fair Housing Act training for its employees and to prominently 
display the fair housing logo in its marketing and advertising materials.
177
 
On June 3, 2008, the Massachusetts Attorney General filed a lawsuit 
against subprime lender Option One Mortgage Corp. (Option One) and its 
parent H&R Block, Inc. (H&R Block) (collectively HRB Entities).  The suit 
alleges that HRB Entities steered prime mortgage borrowers to subprime 
loans, that HRB Entities engaged in predatory lending,
178
 and that it 
produced and distributed to its employees, loan officers, and 
brokers written marketing and educational materials 
explaining that the limited choices available to black and 
 
173. Id. at 569. 
174. Rooting Out Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Using HMDA as a Tool for Fair 
Lending Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 140 (2007) [hereinafter Rooting Out Discrimination] (written 
statement of Kim Kendrick, Assistant Sec‘y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
110_house_hearings&docid=f:38394.pdf. 
175. Id.  Conciliation agreements may provide less probative evidence of intentional 
discrimination.  Parties may choose to enter into these voluntary agreements for myriad reasons 
unassociated with the truth of the underlying complaint.  As an example, lenders may find the costs 
associated with litigation to outweigh the benefits of private conciliation agreements. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Complaint ¶¶ 11, 16, 31–80, 152, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS 
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 3, 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/ 
2008_06_03_option_one_suit_attachment1.pdf.  In a subsequent memorandum decision, the court 
dismissed some of the Commonwealth‘s claims but allowed others to proceed to trial.  
Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS-1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2008) (mem.), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2008_11_12_option_one_pi_attachment1.pdf.  
According to the Massachusetts attorney general‘s office, the case is expected to proceed to trial 
sometime in 2010.  Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Mass., Attorney General Coakley‘s 
Office Reaches Affordable Loan Modification and Foreclosure Prevention Agreement with Mortgage 
Servicer (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid= 
Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2009_11_10_ahmsi_agreement&csid=Cago. 
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Latino borrowers made them good candidates for the HRB 
Entities‘ subprime loan products and that loan originators 
should focus on the ―emerging markets‖ of black and Latino 
homebuyers.
179
 
HRB Entities is also accused of charging black and Latinos more points 
and higher fees under its discretionary pricing policy even when they were 
similarly situated to white HRB Entities borrowers.
180
 
On January 8, 2008, the City of Baltimore filed suit against Wells Fargo 
in the federal district court of Maryland alleging reverse redlining.
181
  In 
addition to HMDA statistics revealing disparate impact based upon race in 
Wells Fargo‘s lending practices, the complaint also alleged that Wells Fargo‘s 
loan ―pricing sheets require that equally credit worthy borrowers in 
predominantly [black] neighborhoods pay higher interest rates compared to 
their counterparts in white neighborhoods.‖182  The City of Baltimore filed an 
amended complaint on June 1, 2009.
183
  The allegations of reverse redlining 
and other forms of racial discrimination in lending were supported, in part, by 
declarations of former employees who described various practices and 
techniques that were designed to steer black borrowers into subprime loans. 
Elizabeth M. Jacobson worked for Wells Fargo for nearly nine years, first 
as a loan officer and later as a sales manager.
184
  For much of her career at 
Wells Fargo, she specialized in the subprime loan business.
185
  Ms. Jacobson 
described a practice pursuant to which loan officers specializing in prime 
loans used their discretion or falsified loan applications for the purpose of 
 
179. Complaint ¶ 120, H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS; see APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, 
at 64 (―Predatory practices not only include outright deception and fraud, but also efforts to 
manipulate the borrower through aggressive sales tactics or to exploit their lack of understanding 
about loan terms.‖). 
180. Complaint ¶ 14, H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS. 
181. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages ¶ 6, Mayor of Baltimore v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2008).  On January 6, 2010, the 
district court granted Wells Fargo‘s motion to dismiss the city‘s complaint for lack of standing with 
leave to file a more limited complaint before February 3, 2010.  The court found that there was an 
insufficient causal connection between Wells Fargo‘s alleged misconduct and the city‘s claimed 
damages.  Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM 1:08 CV-00062 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 
2010). 
182. Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 55 (2008) 
(written statement of Suzanne Sangree, Chief Solicitor, Baltimore City Law Department), available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/42850.PDF; see also First Amended Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages ¶¶ 72–78, 91–94, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL (D. Md. June 1, 2009), dismissed by No. JFM 1:08 CV-
00062 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2010). 
183. First Amended Complaint at 60, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL. 
184. Declaration of Elizabeth M. Jacobson ¶¶ 2–3, id. 
185. Id. ¶¶ 3–7. 
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steering certain of their prime loan customers to her for subprime loans.
186
  
Some of these borrowers ―could have qualified for a prime loan‖187 while 
others were ineligible and should not have received any type of loan.
188
  
Ms. Jacobson stated that a significant majority of her customers were black 
and that the company‘s ―Emerging Markets unit specifically targeted black 
churches‖189 while white churches were not marketed to nor were they 
targeted by subprime loan officers.
190
  If what Ms. Jacobson says is to be 
believed and if Wells Fargo‘s culture focused ―solely on making as much 
money as possible[,]‖191 one might inquire why Wells Fargo‘s loan officers 
targeted black borrowers (even those who qualified for prime loans) and black 
churches for subprime loans instead of focusing indiscriminately on 
borrowers and churches of all colors and makeups.  Possible answers to this 
inquiry are developed in Part VI. 
Tony Paschal worked as a loan officer or mortgage consultant for Wells 
Fargo for eight years between 1997 and 2007.
192
  He stated that Wells Fargo 
targeted blacks for subprime loans by special marketing to black communities 
and by using black subprime loans officers to market to black communities.
193
  
―For example, if a Wells Fargo loan officer anywhere in the United States 
wanted to send a flyer to consumers in [a black] neighborhood soliciting 
subprime loans, he could access software on his computer that would print out 
a flyer to persons speaking the language of ‗African American.‘‖194  Wells 
Fargo maintained an ―Affinity Group Marketing section‖195 that consisted 
exclusively of black employees, and the Affinity Group targeted black 
churches and their members for subprime loans.
196
  According to Mr. Paschal, 
loan officers ―regularly originated subprime loans to [blacks] . . . who could 
have qualified for a lower cost prime loan or FHA loan.‖197 
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) conducted a 
 
186. Id. ¶ 18.  Wells Fargo‘s commission system ―made it more profitable for a loan officer to 
refer a prime customer for a subprime loan than make the prime loan directly to the customer.‖   
Id. ¶ 8. 
187. Id. ¶ 17. 
188. Id. ¶ 18. 
189. Id. ¶ 27. 
190. Id. ¶ 30. 
191. Id. ¶ 32. 
192. Declaration of Tony Paschal ¶ 2, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL. 
193. Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
194. Id. ¶ 11. 
195. Id. ¶ 12; see also infra Part VI (discussing cultural affinity). 
196. Declaration of Tony Paschal ¶ 12, Mayor of Baltimore, No. 1:08-cv-00062-BEL. 
197. Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 13–14 (containing additional allegations of discrimination against black 
borrowers). 
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mystery shopping initiative between February 2004 and June 2006.
198
  The 
NCRC visited mortgage brokers and conducted 106 ―mystery shops‖ in 
Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Houston, Texas; 
Los Angeles, California; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C.
199
  The 
NCRC sent auditors, mystery shoppers, with similar credit histories and 
incomes but of different ethnicities and races to contact and meet with lenders 
to discuss their mortgage products.
200
  In fact, the protected class auditors 
―were actually given more attractive profiles in terms of their amount of 
equity, credit standing and employment tenure, and should have logically 
received better treatment.‖201  The control group consisted of white auditors, 
and the protected group was comprised of black and Hispanic auditors.  The 
NCRC audit resulted in the following findings.  Lenders discussed fees with 
30% of the protected group and with 74% of the control group.
202
  Mortgage 
brokers provided twice as many rate quotes to the control group as to the 
protected group so that the control group received the benefit of more credit 
products.
203
  Control group auditors were referred to banks 16% of the time 
while only 8% of the time were protected group auditors referred to banks, 
where presumably they could get a better rate.
204
  Seven percent of the time, 
the control group was ―referred up‖ (i.e., told they could obtain a better rate 
elsewhere), while the protected group was never referred up for a better 
rate.
205
  During the interview, brokers asked protected group auditors 40% of 
the time if they had prior foreclosures, debts, late payments, or poor credit; 
only 9% of the control group auditors were asked similar questions.
206
  The 
NCRC audit shows that even though the financial profiles of the members of 
the protected group were superior to those of the control group, blacks posing 
as borrowers received significantly worse treatment and were offered less 
information and costlier terms than whites. 
 
198. Building Sustainable Homeownership: Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer 
Choice: Hearing Before the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 88–89 (2006) (testimony of 
David Berenbaum, Executive Vice President, National Community Reinvestment Coalition) 
[hereinafter Building Sustainable Homeownership], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060609/transcript.pdf. 
199. Rooting Out Discrimination, supra note 174, at 268 (testimony of John Taylor, President 
and CEO, National Community Reinvestment Coalition). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Building Sustainable Homeownership, supra note 198, at 89.  Elsewhere, National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition president and CEO John Taylor asserted that lenders discussed 
fees with white testers 62% of the time and with blacks only 35% of the time.  Rooting Out 
Discrimination, supra note 174, at 268. 
203. Sustainable Homeownership, supra note 198, at 89. 
204. Id. at 90. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 90–91. 
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Previous auditing by the NCRC of twelve major subprime lenders in 
Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, 
California, New York, New York; and Washington, D.C., between May and 
September 2003 revealed similar results.
207
  Forty-eight audits were 
conducted.
208
  Auditors were given substantially similar profiles; however, 
black auditors were given profiles that would make them appear more 
qualified than white auditors.  Black auditors had higher income, better ratios, 
longer job histories, longer duration in their homes, and higher credit 
scores.
209
  All of the testing was preapplication; when questioned by the 
lenders about their credit scores, black auditors reported their FICO score as 
690 and white auditors reported theirs as 675.
210
  Both black and white 
auditors were given profiles that would qualify them for prime loans.
211
 
The audits were analyzed to determine any differences in treatment 
received by the white auditors and the black auditors.  The NCRC concluded 
that 45% of the time, black auditors received less favorable treatment than 
white auditors.
212
  White auditors were more often referred up the prime 
lending division; they were given more detailed information and quoted lower 
interest rates or ranges of rates.
213
  White auditors received more 
recommendations, advice, follow-up, and more time with the loan officers.
214
  
White and black auditors received different literature and materials and 
different information regarding interest rates, loan terms, loan programs, fees, 
required ratios, and qualification standards.
215
  In some instances, loan officers 
gave white auditors loan quotes based upon the information provided by the 
white auditors, but refused to provide interest rate quotes to black auditors 
without a credit check or credit report.
216
 
The NCRC audits and the other studies mentioned strongly rebut claims 
by lenders and others that differences in lending patterns between blacks and 
whites are explained solely or primarily by risk characteristics such as the 
borrowers‘ credit scores.  After controlling for the borrower‘s credit and for 
legitimate, individual borrower qualification criteria, one might reasonably 
question whether blacks ―are being discriminated against in the marketplace 
 
207. Memorandum from Nat‘l Cmty. Reinv. Coal., Sub-Prime Fair Lending ―Mystery 
Shopping‖ Update (July 21, 2008) (on file with author). 
208. Id. at 2. 
209. Id. at 3. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 5. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 7–8. 
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and being forced to pay a ‗race tax‘ due to unequal access to credit.‖217 
VI.  THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS: CULTURAL AFFINITY AND THE  
SOCIOLOGY OF THE MINORITY 
The subprime market mushroomed, partly in response to the narrow profit 
margins in the prime market and partly in response to demands for higher 
returns.
218
  By 2000, Wall Street investment banks were demanding subprime 
loans, which they purchased and bundled into mortgage-backed securities and 
sold.  Securitization of credit, also known as asset securitization, is a financial 
term that describes the process of packaging, underwriting, and selling 
mortgage loans and mortgage refinances.
219
  Any asset that produces an 
income stream can be securitized—automobile loans, utility accounts, credit 
card balances, or mortgages, for example.  Securitized mortgages are 
marketed as mortgage-backed securities and then sold to individuals and 
institutional investors.  The efficiencies of securitization grew rapidly in the 
prime market.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest and second-largest 
providers of capital for home loans in the United States, respectively, 
competed for prime loans from banks, resulting in a diminution in the profit 
margins for prime mortgage-backed securities.
220
 
A central assumption of this Article is that mortgage lenders are highly 
competitive and that their primary motivation is to make money and 
maximize profits.
221
  An important conceptual distinction to address is 
whether lenders can be labeled as engaging in intentional discrimination if 
their motivation is to increase profits or ―whether prejudice must be put ahead 
 
217. Rooting Out Discrimination, supra note 174, at 269 (testimony of John Taylor, President 
and CEO, National Community Reinvestment Coalition). 
218. Subprime borrowers are charged higher interest rates because they are perceived to be 
greater credit risks.  Those who invested in securities based upon subprime mortgages received 
higher returns compared to securities based upon prime mortgages.  Alec Klein & Zachary A. 
Goldfarb, The Bubble: How Homeowners, Speculators and Wall Street Dealmakers Rode a Wave of 
Easy Money with Crippling Consequences, WASH. POST, June 15, 2008, at A1. 
219. For a general description of the effects of securitization on the housing market, see 
Kathleen Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June 
1, 2008, at B1. 
220. Jody Shenn, U.S. Home-Loan Giants Weathering the Crisis? Subprime Exposure Is Big 
but High-Grade, INT‘L HERALD TRIB. (Paris, Fr.), July 30, 2007, at 12.  ―Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, created by Congress to increase mortgage financing, own or guarantee about 40 percent of U.S. 
home loan debt.  They make money by investing in mortgages and related bonds and from fees for 
guaranteeing repayment on securities created out of loans from primary lenders.‖  Id.; Day, supra 
note 219. 
221. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing 
a contrary assumption); Longhofer, supra note 156, at 13 (―Translated to the mortgage market, this 
means that rather than being ‗profit maximizers,‘ bigoted lenders are ‗utility maximizers‘ who are 
willing to sacrifice profits in order to satisfy their ‗tastes for discrimination.‘‖). 
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of profits for behavior to be labeled as discriminatory.‖222 
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker developed the theory of taste-based 
discrimination.
223
  According to Becker‘s theory: 
Money, commonly used as a measuring rod, will also 
serve as a measure of discrimination.  If an individual has a 
―taste for discrimination,‖ he must act as if he were willing to 
pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced 
income, to be associated with some persons instead of others.  
When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either 
pay or forfeit income for this privilege.  This simple way of 
looking at the matter gets at the essence of prejudice and 
discrimination.
224
 
Becker also distinguishes between discrimination grounded in prejudice 
and discrimination grounded in economic efficiency, the former being the 
more pernicious as prejudice reflects preference and is independent of 
knowledge, while perceptions of the most economically efficient choice can 
be changed by the dissemination of accurate information.
225
 
A lender may target black borrowers for subprime loans because the 
lender is prejudiced; alternatively, the lender may underestimate the economic 
efficiency or value of the borrower or, the corollary, the lender may 
overestimate the risk of lending to black borrowers and therefore target these 
borrowers for subprime loans.
226
  ―Since a taste for discrimination 
incorporates both prejudice and ignorance, the amount of knowledge available 
must be included as a determinant of tastes.‖227  Even in the face of a lot of 
knowledge about black borrowers (objective signals),
228
 prejudiced lenders 
may choose to discriminate by offering loans on terms that are less attractive 
than what the objective signals indicate the black borrowers should receive.  
Such a decision might indicate that ignorance about black borrowers is 
secondary to lenders‘ prejudice and would weaken an assumption that the 
solution to the current dilemma this Article addresses is the ―wholesale spread 
 
222. Ladd, supra note 69, at 42. 
223. BECKER, supra note 221, at 16. 
224. Id. at 14. 
225. Id. at 16. 
226. See id.; Austin, supra note 5, at 1250.  Austin observes that blacks are generally associated 
with a cash economy and are stereotyped as ―‗wasteful consumers.‘‖  Austin, supra note 5, at 1250 
(citation omitted).  As a result, they ―are . . . assumed not to know the value of money or how to deal 
with financial matters in a knowledgeable way.‖  Id.; see APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 28 
(―[T]oday‘s dual mortgage market fails to achieve what economists term ‗allocational efficiency‘ 
because similarly situated borrowers pay different prices to obtain a mortgage of given characteristics 
and terms.‖). 
227. BECKER, supra note 221, at 17. 
228. See infra notes 245–58 and accompanying text. 
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of knowledge.‖229 
If, by definition, individuals with a taste for discrimination will behave as 
though they are prepared to forfeit income for the actual privilege of 
discriminating,
230
 and if Becker‘s theory is applied in the context of the 
mortgage market, then lenders with a taste for discrimination should be 
willing to forgo profit for the privilege of discriminating.  Following Becker‘s 
theory, one might contend that some actions by lenders that would, according 
to law, be interpreted as discriminatory treatment of black borrowers, actually 
do not result from lender prejudice because the lenders were aiming to 
maximize profits.
231
  Adherents to this view of discrimination would be 
willing to conclude that lenders were intentionally discriminating based upon 
illegal prejudice if provided with knowledge in the form of ―evidence that the 
group receiving the differentially adverse treatment imposes credit risks that 
on average are no higher than those imposed by other groups of borrowers.‖232 
In contrast to the taste-based theory of discrimination, adverse treatment 
of black borrowers may be the result of statistical discrimination—
discrimination that lenders engage in because it is more cost-efficient 
(cheaper) to use borrowers‘ group status, such as race or gender, to project 
their creditworthiness than it is to use borrowers‘ individual past history.233  
The statistical definition of discrimination is broader than that captured by the 
taste-based theory and more reflective of the content of anti-discrimination 
laws governing lending and housing.
234
  ―The legal definition of racial 
discrimination does not presume that lenders are foregoing profits to exercise 
prejudice against the protected group.  Hence, illegal discrimination need not 
be uneconomic in the sense that it reduces profits.‖235 
The definition of discrimination used here—identifying an emerging 
market of borrowers, black borrowers, and intentionally targeting them to 
receive less attractive loan products than similarly situated white borrowers—
is broader than the definition of discrimination offered by Becker.  This 
broader definition anticipates lenders attempting to capture greater gains, the 
contrary of forgoing profits, by trading upon their assumption about black 
borrowers based upon their group status.  It more closely reflects the legal 
definition of discrimination in housing and mortgage law. 
 
229. BECKER, supra note 221, at 17. 
230. Id. at 14.   
231. See id.; Ladd, supra note 69, at 42. 
232. Ladd, supra note 69, at 42. 
233. Id. 
234. See supra notes 48, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
235. Ladd, supra note 69, at 43; see, e.g., supra notes 57–60 (discussing the Federal Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 (as amended), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977, and their anti-discrimination provisions). 
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If one accepts the assumption that lenders are motivated by profit, 
predominantly if not exclusively, what explains the persistence of intentional 
lending discrimination in the mortgage industry, a highly competitive market?  
One popular theory of the source of discrimination in mortgage lending is the 
cultural affinity hypothesis, first proposed by Charles W. Calomiris, 
Charles M. Kahn, and Stanley D. Longhofer in their article Housing-Finance 
Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor.
236
  
According to the cultural affinity hypothesis, lenders discriminate against 
borrowers with whom they do not have a cultural affinity or experiential 
background because they find it more difficult, specifically more costly, to 
evaluate these borrowers‘ creditworthiness when compared to borrowers with 
whom they share the same cultural affinity.
237
  Lenders find it less cost-
effective to invest in gathering information about black borrowers either 
because the expected benefits of investing in this additional information are 
lower for these groups than for whites
238
 or because the lender perceives that 
it is simply more expensive to gather information about black borrowers than 
white borrowers.
239
  As a result, Calomiris et al. argue that, because it is easier 
and less costly to evaluate borrowers with whom lenders, who are mostly non-
minority, share a cultural affinity, lenders will tend to discriminate against 
minority borrowers.
240
 
The cultural affinity hypothesis has most often been used to explain 
mortgage market discrimination focusing on denial rates.
241
  In this Article, I 
extend the hypothesis to consider how problems of cultural affinity might 
affect loan terms.  Additionally, I argue that, consistent with the new iteration 
of housing discrimination that is besetting the mortgage and housing markets, 
―cultural affinity‖ has grown to take on new meaning.  Traditionally, the 
cultural affinity hypothesis was used to explain disparities in loan denial rates 
between whites and blacks based upon whether the lender and the borrower 
shared the same race or cultural affinity.
242
  The cultural affinity hypothesis 
applies in other contexts as well and helps provide insights on mortgage 
discrimination in additional contexts such as situations in which the borrower 
 
236. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635.  
237. Id. at 650.   
238. One explanation is that, on average, they are poorer than whites.  Id.  
239. Id.; see also Austin, supra note 5, at 1218.  Austin argues that ―black people‘s money is 
literally a distinctive currency worth less than white people‘s money, both socially and materially.‖  
Austin, supra note 5, at 1218.  Lenders adopting this position would find it comparatively more 
expensive to lend to blacks than whites.  Id. at 1251. 
240. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650; see also Longhofer, supra note 156, at 13. 
241. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635; Hunter & Walker, supra note 19; Longhofer, supra 
note 156, at 12. 
242. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635. 
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and lender are of the same race.  Thus, I extend the definition of cultural 
affinity to include black lenders and brokers whose actual or self-perceived 
cultural affinity and experiential backgrounds are more closely aligned with 
white borrowers. 
The essence of the cultural affinity hypothesis is uncertainty—because the 
lender is uncertain about lending money to groups outside of the lender‘s race, 
lenders will perceive the credit indicators of these groups as unreliable, even 
when the indicators of an individual group member exceed the lender‘s 
requirements.  As a result of this perception of unreliability, lenders will tend 
to discriminate against black borrowers, not only in their acceptance and 
denial rates, but in the quality of loans offered to these borrowers.  Old forms 
of housing and lending discrimination facilitated this uncertainty by denying 
black borrowers traditional access to credit.
243
  Cultural affinity 
institutionalizes the uncertainty about certain borrowers based upon race and 
even rationalizes discrimination against these individuals.
244
 
Stanley Longhofer, one of the original proponents of the cultural affinity 
hypothesis, considers the distorting effect of the secondary market on cultural 
affinity in the home mortgage market.  He begins with a series of 
propositions.  First, lenders receive ―objective signals‖ about a borrower‘s 
creditworthiness, such as FICO scores, credit history, employment, income, 
and obligation ratios, that are objectively observable by outsiders.
245
  
Objective signals are derived from the information lenders collect as part of 
the loan evaluation process and which lenders believe allow them to infer the 
likelihood of a borrower‘s default.246  Lenders receive objective signals from 
minority and non-minority borrowers. 
Second, lenders also receive private, ―subjective signals,‖ but only for the 
group with which they have a cultural affinity; Longhofer assumes this would 
be the non-minority group (subjective signals).
247
  Subjective signals include 
―any subjective information beyond the standard underwriting variables that 
lenders gather during the application process. . . .  [They are] often referred to 
as ‗compensating factors.‘‖248  Consequently, lenders have more information 
about the group with whom they share a cultural affinity; the information, if 
positive, can be used by the lenders to compensate for negative information 
 
243. See APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 70 (Unlike in the past, housing ―advocates today 
must focus less on whether any lending takes place, and more on whether the lending that does take 
place is done at the best rates and terms for which borrowers would qualify.‖).  
244. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650; Hunter & Walker, supra note 19, at 67–68; 
Longhofer, supra note 156, at 19–20. 
245. Longhofer, supra note 156, at 15. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
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the lenders gathered in the evaluation process and captured as part of the 
objective signaling.
249
  The new information may also be negative, suggesting 
that, perhaps contrary to the objective signal, the borrower is a poor credit 
risk.
250
  According to Longhofer, underlying the objective and subjective 
signals is the basic fact that lenders trust information they receive about their 
own group more than they trust the information they receive about other 
groups, hence the cultural affinity effect.  Finally, Longhofer suggests that 
many lenders seem only rarely to reject applicants who have 
passed the initial screen, raising the question of whether 
negative overrides really do outnumber positive ones.  Once a 
[white] applicant has been approved using the first (objective) 
signal, lenders may choose to ignore any additional ―bad‖ 
information they receive about that applicant or, perhaps more 
likely, may never bother to observe the second signal at all.
251
 
So, white borrowers have the benefit of objective and subjective 
information available to the lender.  If the objective information is negative, 
the lender can use the subjective information to compensate, and if the 
objective information is positive, the lender may never consider the subjective 
information that might lead the lender to make a poor lending decision if the 
subjective information is negative and overwhelms the positive objective 
information.  If lenders are not gathering as much subjective information from 
black borrowers, the potential for using this information to compensate for 
negative objective information is minimized.  Further, I also suggest that in 
addition to Longhofer‘s hypothesis, lenders make negative assumptions about 
the nature of the subjective information that would be gathered from blacks 
based on negative stereotypes, which further harms these borrowers. 
If the first signal, the objective signal, correlates with the information that 
secondary market institutions will require if they are to guarantee or purchase 
the lender‘s loans, then the lenders who sell to the secondary market have 
absolutely no incentive to consider negative information about borrowers who 
are acceptable by secondary market institutions, even when lenders have 
available to them negative subjective signals.
252
  The lender will always use 
positive subjective signals though when the objective signals do not meet 
secondary market standards of acceptability.  Secondary market lenders permit 
consideration of compensating factors when loans would not be acceptable on 
the secondary market based upon the initial objective signal.  And, even if the 
lender cannot document that the loans‘ quality meets the secondary market‘s 
 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 20. 
252. Id. 
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criteria, the lender could decide to hold a loan that is obviously creditworthy, 
after considering the subjective signal, in its own portfolio.
253
 
Longhofer draws several conclusions regarding the distorting effects of 
secondary markets on discrimination in home mortgage lending.  First, 
assuming lenders have a cultural affinity with white borrowers, minority 
borrowers will be denied loans more frequently than white borrowers when 
lenders ignore the negative information contained in the subjective signal for 
white borrowers.
254
  Second, even when lenders are not discriminating they 
will appear to be discriminating against blacks by requiring them to meet 
more stringent standards.  And finally, it appears to outsiders that lenders are 
holding blacks more stringently to traditional underwriting criteria than white 
applicants.
255
 
An absolute risk is associated with lenders‘ misunderstanding or biased 
perceptions of the black economy, even when these borrowers‘ objective 
measures such as FICO and credit scores surpass the lenders‘ own articulated 
standards. 
A belief in black intellectual inferiority makes investments in 
black people, their property, and their communities seem 
riskier than comparable investments in whites.  A belief that 
black borrowers are stupid or incompetent will lead to . . . 
higher interest rates, demands for more information, and 
higher transaction costs in credit transactions involving 
blacks.  Some blacks have internalized these notions.  Others 
have accommodated their financial practices and preferences 
to them.  Fear of being denied credit, for example, drives 
some creditworthy blacks to seek loans in the fringe or 
subprime sector where they receive money on less favorable 
terms than comparably situated whites.
256
 
Historically, lenders simply denied many black borrowers‘ loans.257  
Today, instead of expressing their worry about risk by denying loans, lenders 
have absorbed this risk and managed their worry with higher rates and poorer 
loan terms for black borrowers.
258
  Risk has thus become translated into less 
attractive products that are more likely to default. 
Moreover, evidence of higher default rates among black borrowers than 
 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Austin, supra note 5, at 1251 (citations omitted). 
257. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
258. Lenders are even charging rates that exceed what can be explained based upon borrower 
risk factors and neighborhood risk factors.  See APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 40. 
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white borrowers may provide a motive for lenders to steer the former toward 
subprime products, even when the individual applicant meets or exceeds the 
lenders‘ loan criteria.259  There is not a lot of available information on default 
rates by race.
260
  The information that does exist suggests that black borrowers 
default at a higher rate than white borrowers, even after controlling for the 
borrowers’ relevant economic characteristics.261  Ironically, this practice of 
steering may actually have the opposite of its intended effect and may 
increase lenders‘ risk as borrowers laden with excessive monthly mortgage 
payments may be more likely to default than similarly situated borrowers with 
lower monthly payments.
262
  Additionally, some studies have measured 
borrower default by looking at lender foreclosures.
263
  Lenders exercise 
discretion when deciding whether to foreclose; thus, studies that measure 
borrower default rates based upon lender foreclosure statistics may be 
capturing information about lender preferences and behavior rather than 
information purely about borrowers‘ behaviors. 
One can argue that higher default rates among black borrowers justify the 
higher representations of these borrowers in the subprime category and are 
consistent with ―rational discrimination‖264 or profit maximization.265  These 
results can also be explained as consistent with cultural affinity.  ―[T]he added 
screening costs brought about by ‗cultural affinities‘ . . . can lead to minorities 
endogenously exhibiting higher default rates than do whites . . . .‖266  Cultural 
affinities create higher costs that are passed on through more expensive, 
subprime products—loans with higher interest rates, credit enhancements 
such as private mortgage insurance, and higher fees.  If the average likelihood 
of default increases as the loan becomes more expensive and if cultural 
affinity results in lenders pushing black borrowers into subprime loans when 
similar white borrowers would be offered prime loans, black borrowers may 
very well find themselves, more often than their white counterparts, in 
situations where the interest rate reaches a critically high level in the face of 
falling property values and it no longer makes economic sense to continue 
paying the loan.  And, moreover, lenders may not in all cases be harmed when 
these defaulted loans are foreclosed.  In some instances, lenders roll high 
 
259. But see Ladd, supra note 69, at 47 (discussing why the process of selling loans in the 
secondary market should make loan originators less concerned and focused on ―race-specific 
probability of default‖). 
260. Id. at 46; Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 653. 
261. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 635. 
262. APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 29. 
263. Ladd, supra note 69, at 54. 
264. Calomiris et al., supra note 19, at 650 n.25. 
265. Id. at 650. 
266. Id. at 635. 
2010] RACE TO THE SUBPRIME 955 
front-end fees into the mortgage, which then may be paid out of the equity 
(assuming there is any) as part of the lender‘s foreclosure process.267  These 
fees may be sufficient to compensate the lender for the default.
268
 
Regina Austin makes a compelling argument that this country‘s history of 
racial discrimination in lending has resulted in creating a dual currency 
system in which the money of blacks is literally worth less than that of 
whites.
269
  Her argument offers an alternative understanding of the perceived 
risk associated with black people‘s money.  She contends that 
[t]hrough blacks‘ historic confinement to segregated markets 
immune to legal attack and the operation of a culture of 
dealing that is permeated by economic stereotypes and 
practices borne of blacks‘ unequal material conditions, money 
in the hands of black Americans has come to be devalued like 
the currency of a ―Third World‖ country.  The devaluation 
has taken on a life of its own.  The assumption that black 
people‘s money is worth less taints commercial transactions 
of all sorts and perpetuates blacks‘ subordinate economic 
status.  Nowhere is the adverse impact of this interaction of 
race, culture, law, and economics, better reflected than in the 
area of personal finance and the lack of success that blacks 
encounter in transactions with financial institutions and other 
firms dealing in money as a commodity.
270
 
Segregation forced black borrowers into an informal economy, meaning 
an economy that was largely unregulated and that was little understood by 
those operating in the formal economy.
271
  Thus, little value and social 
significance was attached to their money.  These borrowers are perceived as 
riskier and worthy of relegation to second-class credit. 
Black borrowers have accepted these less attractive subprime and 
predatory products.  The products are less attractive to the extent these loans 
are more expensive than what black borrowers‘ objective measures would 
indicate they are entitled to receive.  Perhaps black borrowers accept these 
products because they do not know that better terms are available (due to 
historic denials to the social interactions with those who have traditionally 
dealt in the formal credit economy);
272
 perhaps because though they know 
better loan terms are available, they have grown accustomed, over time, to 
 
267. APGAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 66. 
268. Id.  
269. Austin, supra note 5, at 1218.  
270. Id.   
271. Id. at 1257 (―Blacks are not alone in having a lower value attached to their money.  Other 
minorities, including women and the poor, are essentially in the same boat.‖). 
272. See supra Part II. 
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less attractive loan terms and do not believe that they can borrow on better 
terms;
273
 or perhaps because in their experience, the market just will not give 
them better products even when they demand better products.  Lenders 
became aware that past discrimination created a vulnerable and therefore 
valuable market of black borrowers.  The history of the housing and financing 
markets stacked the cards against this group of borrowers, making it virtually 
inevitable that, when these subprime and predatory loan incentives came 
along, lenders believed they could target black borrowers without acting 
illegally.  Past discrimination limited the ability of black borrowers to develop 
credit histories and to participate in the formal credit economy.  So now, 
lenders cannot relate to these borrowers, and the lack of cultural affinity 
reinforces the risk lenders associate with lending to them. 
The poor credit histories, FICO scores, income histories, and other 
objective factors lined up perfectly for many black borrowers and justified 
their relegation to the subprime market.  Even when these objective factors 
indicated the contrary—that black borrowers qualified for prime products—
many lenders steered them into the subprime market anyway.  Driven by 
cynicism, lenders‘ approaches to lending to black borrowers resulted in this 
intent to discriminate. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
What is happening today in the subprime market to black borrowers is a 
result of prior discrimination in housing and lending.
274
  Historic 
discrimination has consistently, over time, secured white prosperity, 
undermined black acquisition of property, and facilitated the divestment of 
property from blacks who managed to acquire this important resource.
275
 
[T]he old inequality helped to make the new inequality 
possible.  The new inequality in home mortgage lending is 
part of a greater phenomenon in which apparent gains made 
by [blacks] have come at far higher costs than have gains 
made by other segments of society.  While we might 
reasonably argue that the new forms of inequality are better 
than the old, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is 
inequality, nonetheless: recent gains in credit for underserved 
markets have come with a price.
276
 
The proper role of government in addressing the subprime mortgage 
 
273. See id. 
274. See id.  
275. See supra notes 1–5 and Parts I–II. 
276. Williams et al., supra note 6, at 182; see also APGAR ET AL., supra note 29 (stating that 
changes in the mortgage market pose new challenges for neighborhoods once the targets of 
redlining). 
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market failures depends upon the sources and causes of these failures.  Black 
borrowers are being steered into subprime products because of cultural 
affinities and lenders‘ obsessions with maximizing profit by targeting 
emerging populations.  Policies should be designed to ensure the suitability of 
borrowers for the loans they receive and to punish lenders who attempt to 
trade upon the disadvantages borne from past discrimination to further isolate 
historically disadvantaged borrowers. 
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TABLE 1: 2006 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA 
State Race277 
Total # of 
Applicants278 
% 
Applying 
to HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders279 
Standard 
Error280 
Pr(T<t)281 
 
% 
Accepted 
at HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders282 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
% of Loans 
3+ Points 
over 
Comparable 
Treasury 
Rate283 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
AL White 236,937 0.149 0.001 0.00 0.084 0.001 0.00 0.148 0.002 0.00 
 Black 72,046 0.315 0.002  0.232 0.002  0.262 0.014  
AK White 39,469 0.154 0.002 0.00 0.081 0.002 0.00 0.225 0.001 0.00 
 Black 1,651 0.260 0.011  0.165 0.012  0.322 0.004  
AZ White 749,919 0.187 0.000 0.00 0.140 0.001 0.00 0.201 0.001 0.00 
 Black 33,455 0.222 0.002  0.201 0.003  0.331 0.005  
AR White 127,358 0.119 0.001 0.00 0.070 0.001 0.00 0.209 0.000 0.00 
 Black 16,113 0.278 0.004  0.219 0.004  0.325 0.001  
CA White 2,614,907 0.202 0.000 0.00 0.151 0.000 0.00 0.154 0.001 0.00 
 Black 280,327 0.277 0.001  0.249 0.001  0.311 0.005  
CO White 480,405 0.147 0.001 0.00 0.088 0.001 0.00 0.158 0.001 0.00 
 Black 21,305 0.267 0.003  0.217 0.004  0.364 0.004  
CT White 234,178 0.191 0.001 0.00 0.116 0.001 0.00 0.093 0.003 0.00 
 Black 33,251 0.347 0.003  0.304 0.004  0.311 0.004  
DE White 64,484 0.160 0.001 0.00 0.096 0.001 0.00 0.258 0.000 0.00 
 Black 19,308 0.289 0.003  0.234 0.004  0.413 0.001  
DC White 17,978 0.060 0.002 0.00 0.042 0.002 0.00 0.148 0.002 0.00 
 Black 26,944 0.208 0.002  0.181 0.002  0.318 0.005  
FL White 1,755,419 0.214 0.000 0.00 0.159 0.000 0.00 0.174 0.001 0.00 
 Black 322,716 0.369 0.001  0.327 0.001  0.364 0.001  
 
277. Race of the borrower. 
278. Total number of applicants for mortgages in that particular state of each race. 
279. Percentage of applicants applying for loans from subprime lenders, as classified by 
appearance on the 2005 HUD subprime lender list. 
280. The standard error, or the standard deviation of the sampling estimate. 
281. The probability that the differences in percentages between white and black borrowers is 
due to chance. 
282. The percentage of loans accepted by subprime lenders, as classified by appearance on the 
2005 HUD subprime lender list. 
283. The percentage of loans accepted by subprime lenders, as classified by a loan rate of three 
points or more above the comparable Treasury rate. 
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State Race277 
Total # of 
Applicants278 
% 
Applying 
to HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders279 
Standard 
Error280 
Pr(T<t)281 
 
% 
Accepted 
at HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders282 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
% of Loans 
3+ Points 
over 
Comparable 
Treasury 
Rate283 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
GA White 516,012 0.141 0.000 0.00 0.078 0.000 0.00 0.141 0.002 0.00 
 Black 288,685 0.304 0.001  0.235 0.001  0.240 0.012  
HI White 43,083 0.134 0.002 0.00 0.101 0.002 0.00 0.092 0.001 0.00 
 Black 1,985 0.210 0.009  0.176 0.011  0.165 0.019  
ID White 150,911 0.143 0.001 0.00 0.092 0.001 0.00 0.187 0.001 0.00 
 Black 732 0.217 0.015  0.165 0.019  0.277 0.023  
IL White 824,327 0.194 0.000 0.00 0.132 0.000 0.00 0.206 0.001 0.00 
 Black 180,788 0.382 0.001  0.329 0.002  0.433 0.003  
IN White 413,193 0.192 0.001 0.00 0.105 0.001 0.00 0.219 0.001 0.00 
 Black 43,735 0.337 0.002  0.260 0.003  0.420 0.003  
IA White 178,577 0.183 0.001 0.00 0.105 0.001 0.00 0.129 0.001 0.00 
 Black 3,736 0.297 0.297  0.213 0.009  0.177 0.006  
KS White 229,589 0.161 0.001 0.00 0.100 0.001 0.00 0.200 0.001 0.00 
 Black 17,496 0.275 0.003  0.215 0.004  0.334 0.005  
KY White 229,589 0.161 0.001 0.00 0.100 0.001 0.00 0.128 0.001 0.00 
 Black 17,496 0.275 0.003  0.215 0.004  0.309 0.002  
LA White 182,534 0.128 0.001 0.00 0.086 0.001 0.00 0.206 0.001 0.00 
 Black 62,383 0.309 0.002  0.257 0.003  0.387 0.003  
ME White 93,649 0.203 0.001 0.00 0.127 0.001 0.00 0.127 0.001 0.00 
 Black 521 0.365 0.021  0.272 0.027  0.272 0.027  
MD White 357,272 0.184 0.001 0.00 0.119 0.001 0.00 0.189 0.001 0.00 
 Black 233,611 0.322 0.001  0.259 0.001  0.367 0.001  
MA White 420,222 0.183 0.001 0.00 0.114 0.001 0.00 0.158 0.001 0.00 
 Black 38,055 0.365 0.002  0.320 0.003  0.373 0.004  
MI White 685,344 0.185 0.000 0.00 0.109 0.000 0.00 0.204 0.001 0.00 
 Black 143,851 0.365 0.001  0.311 0.002  0.431 0.002  
MN White 362,778 0.175 0.001 0.00 0.096 0.001 0.00 0.182 0.001 0.00 
 Black 22,817 0.333 0.003  0.289 0.004  0.397 0.005  
MS White 102,539 0.134 0.001 0.00 0.078 0.001 0.00 0.243 0.002 0.00 
 Black 44,083 0.337 0.002  0.248 0.003  0.409 0.003  
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State Race277 
Total # of 
Applicants278 
% 
Applying 
to HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders279 
Standard 
Error280 
Pr(T<t)281 
 
% 
Accepted 
at HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders282 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
% of Loans 
3+ Points 
over 
Comparable 
Treasury 
Rate283 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
MO White 408,997 0.181 0.001 0.00 0.108 0.001 0.00 0.206 0.001 0.00 
 Black 67,230 0.381 0.002  0.316 0.003  0.438 0.003  
MT White 60,629 0.113 0.001 0.00 0.066 0.001 0.01 0.168 0.002 0.03 
 Black 155 0.181 0.031  0.134 0.038  0.244 0.048  
NE White 93,306 0.173 0.001 0.00 0.104 0.001 0.00 0.193 0.002 0 
 Black 4,362 0.336 0.007  0.261 0.009  0.407 0.010  
NV White 305,752 0.193 0.001 0.00 0.144 0.001 0.00 0.144 0.001 0.00 
 Black 26,978 0.245 0.003  0.229 0.004  0.229 0.004  
NH White 105,835 0.169 0.001 0.00 0.108 0.001 0.00 0.166 0.001 0.00 
 Black 1,221 0.291 0.013  0.215 0.018  0.285 0.019  
NJ White 555,662 0.161 0.000 0.00 0.105 0.001 0.00 0.170 0.001 0.00 
 Black 101,062 0.289 0.001  0.239 0.002  0.351 0.002  
NM White 141,678 0.187 0.001 0.00 0.102 0.001 0.00 0.187 0.001 0.00 
 Black 3,455 0.253 0.007  0.172 0.009  0.285 0.010  
NY White 711,388 0.191 0.000 0.00 0.121 0.001 0.00 0.184 0.001 0.00 
 Black 152,771 0.370 0.001  0.330 0.002  0.379 0.002  
NC White 513,173 0.125 0.0004 0.00 0.074 0.0004 0.00 0.151 0.0006 0.00 
 Black 126,564 0.270 0.001  0.210 0.002  0.344 0.002  
ND White 27,021 0.142 0.002 0.14 0.077 0.002 0.20 0.170 0.003 0.51 
 Black 144 0.174 0.032  0.099 0.030  0.168 0.037  
OH White 681,629 0.195 0.000 0.00 0.119 0.001 0.00 0.203 0.001 0.00 
 Black 99,464 0.337 0.001  0.282 0.002  0.402 0.002  
OK White 200,364 0.181 0.001 0.00 0.108 0.001 0.00 0.225 0.001 0.00 
 Black 17,361 0.336 0.004  0.265 0.005  0.384 0.005  
OR White 325,626 0.137 0.001 0.00 0.085 0.001 0.00 0.085 0.001 0.00 
 Black 6,240 0.172 0.005  0.152 0.007  0.152 0.007  
PA White 783,866 0.172 0.000 0.00 0.093 0.000 0.00 0.160 0.001 0.00 
 Black 88,115 0.273 0.002  0.222 0.002  0.357 0.002  
RI White 80,377 0.235 0.001 0.00 0.148 0.002 0.00 0.190 0.002 0.00 
 Black 5,367 0.389 0.007  0.329 0.009  0.395 0.009  
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State Race277 
Total # of 
Applicants278 
% 
Applying 
to HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders279 
Standard 
Error280 
Pr(T<t)281 
 
% 
Accepted 
at HUD-
Classified 
Subprime 
Lenders282 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
% of Loans 
3+ Points 
over 
Comparable 
Treasury 
Rate283 
Standard 
Error 
Pr(T<t) 
SC White 259,548 0.142 0.001 0.00 0.083 0.001 0.00 0.173 0.001 0.00 
 Black 69,599 0.344 0.002  0.269 0.002  0.374 0.003  
SD White 42,893 0.133 0.002 0.00 0.066 0.001 0.86 0.170 0.002 0.86 
 Black 297 0.185 0.023  0.043 0.017  0.209 0.035  
TN White 374,627 0.176 0.001 0.00 0.107 0.001 0.00 0.193 0.001 0.00 
 Black 80,196 0.378 0.002  0.303 0.002  0.373 0.002  
TX White 1,255,524 0.195 0.000 0.00 0.126 0.000 0.00 0.204 0.000 0.00 
 Black 200,971 0.383 0.001  0.330 0.001  0.368 0.002  
UT White 280,542 0.147 0.001 0.00 0.099 0.001 0.00 0.185 0.001 0.00 
 Black 1,881 0.204 0.009  0.165 0.011  0.296 0.014  
VT White 34,618 0.174 0.002 0.0096 0.110 0.002 0.05 0.141 0.002 0.00 
 Black 228 0.232 0.028  0.154 0.031  0.235 0.037  
VA White 512,606 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.00 0.166 0.001 0.00 
 Black 153,315 0.296 0.001  0.230 0.001  0.342 0.002  
WA White 561,746 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.00 0.178 0.001 0.00 
 Black 25,395 0.241 0.003  0.212 0.004  0.314 0.004  
WV White 96,347 0.122 0.001 0.000 0.075 0.001 0.00 0.221 0.002 0.00 
 Black 3,052 0.199 0.007  0.153 0.009  0.303 0.012  
WI White 392,062 0.160 0.001 0.000 0.088 0.001 0.00 0.173 0.001 0.00 
 Black 30,514 0.365 0.003  0.295 0.004  0.443 0.004  
WY White 38,405 0.157 0.002 0.000 0.088 0.002 0.00 0.194 0.002 0.00 
 Black 299 0.271 0.026  0.190 0.030  0.293 0.035  
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TABLE 2: 2002 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA 
 
2002 SUBPRIME LENDING 
 
Number of Loan 
Applicants 
% Applying to 
Subprime Lenders 
Pr(T < t) 
% Accepted at HUD-
Classified Subprime 
Lenders 
Pr(T < t) 
WHITE 13,867,631 0.0912 0 0.0725 0.05 
BLACK 1,211,921 0.163  0.1233  
 
TABLE 3: 1998 DIFFERENCE OF MEANS DATA 
 
1998 SUBPRIME LENDING 
 
Number of Loan 
Applicants 
% Applying to 
Subprime Lenders 
Pr(T < t) 
% Accepted at HUD-
Classified Subprime 
Lenders 
Pr(T < t) 
WHITE 10,503,741 0.0753 0 0.0651 0.12 
BLACK 1,294,019 0.1323  0.0752  
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF APPLICATIONS NATIONALLY TO  
HUD-CLASSIFIED SUBPRIME LENDERS BY RACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF LOANS ORIGINATED FROM SUBPRIME LENDERS 
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TABLE 4: 2006 CONTROL DATA—ALTERNATIVE MEASURE  
(LOAN IS 3+ POINTS ABOVE COMPARABLE TREASURY RATE)
284
 
State 
Black 
Applicant
285
 
Loan 
Amount 
286
 
HUD 
Income
287
 
Minority 
Population
288
 
Median 
Income 
of 
MSA 
289
 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing
290
 
Income 
291 
Constant 
292
 
Increase of 
Probability 
for Black 
Applicant
293
 
AL 0.014 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.010 4.7% 
AK 0.459 -0.002* 0.000* -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -1.921 5.2% 
AZ 0.151 -0.001 0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.000* 0.000* -2.497 5.2% 
AR 0.298 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 0.000 0.000* 0.685 3.9% 
CA 0.299 0.000* 0.000 0.002 -0.011 0.000* 0.000* -0.417 3.4% 
CO 0.327 -0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -2.037 2.3% 
CT 0.417 0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.011 0.000 -0.002 0.556 3.2% 
DE 0.470 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -1.698 5.2% 
DC 0.775 0.000* — 0.016 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -3.652 7.8% 
FL 0.170 -0.001 0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -1.184 5% 
GA 0.513 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -1.055 6.5% 
HI 0.066* -0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.007 0.000* 0.000 -0.060 — 
ID 0.224 -0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -1.831 5.3% 
IL 0.317 -0.001 0.000* 0.003 -0.005 0.000* 0.000* -1.437 3.7% 
IN 0.212 -0.003 0.000 0.002* -0.006 0.000* 0.000 -0.849 4.2% 
IA 0.105 -0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -1.814 2.7% 
KS 0.274 -0.003 0.000* -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000* -1.029 2.3% 
KY 0.326 -0.003 0.000 -0.001* -0.004 0.000* 0.000* -0.712 6.1% 
 
284. Estimating the effect of race, borrower characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics 
on the likelihood that a borrower receives a loan that is three points or more above the comparable 
Treasury rate. 
285. Dummy variable representing whether or not the borrower was black (versus white). 
286. Amount of the loan (in thousands of dollars). 
287. The maximum income for qualification for HUD services in the census tract. 
288. The percentage of the census tract that is not white. 
289. The median income (in thousands) in the MSA. 
290. The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied. 
291. The income of the borrower (in thousands). 
292. The constant, or the baseline level of subprime lending, represents the base probability of 
receiving a subprime loan (i.e., the log odds that a white person receives subprime loan). 
293. The change in probability if all other variables are kept at their means, but the race of the 
borrower changes from white to black.  This is calculated using Clarify software, developed by Gary 
King. 
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State 
Black 
Applicant
285
 
Loan 
Amount 
286
 
HUD 
Income
287
 
Minority 
Population
288
 
Median 
Income 
of 
MSA 
289
 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing
290
 
Income 
291 
Constant 
292
 
Increase of 
Probability 
for Black 
Applicant
293
 
LA 0.324 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.599 6.2% 
ME 0.427 0.000* 0.000 0.002 -0.010 0.000 0.000* -0.336 3.8% 
MD 0.541 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.552 10% 
MA 0.401 -0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.007 0.000* 0.000 0.234 3.3% 
MI 0.270 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.892 5.8% 
MN 0.543 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.885 4.2% 
MS 0.206 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.194 7.1% 
MO 0.343 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -1.081 4.1% 
MT 0.278* -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.105 3.1% 
NE 0.359 -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.000* 0.000* 0.230 6.1% 
NV 0.235 -0.002 0.000 0.012 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.870 2.8% 
NH 0.241 -0.001 0.000 -0.001* -0.010 0.000* 0.000* -0.174 3.6% 
NJ 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.000* -0.984 3.1% 
NM 0.306 -0.002 0.000* 0.002 -0.002 0.000* 0.000 -1.555 3.8% 
NY 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -1.970 2.1% 
NC 0.235 -0.002 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.870 5.5% 
ND 0.090* -0.004* 0.000* -0.006* -0.009* 0.000* -0.002* 0.279* — 
OH 0.331 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.006 — 0.000 -0.986 6.1% 
OK 0.253 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.549 4.1% 
OR 0.211 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -1.530 2.2% 
PA 0.364 0.000* 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.000 -0.425 3.1% 
RI 0.298 0.000 — 0.002 -0.012 0.000 0.000* -0.908 2.6% 
SC 0.356 -0.003 0.000 -0.001* -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.987 3.9% 
SD -0.162* -0.007* 0.000* -0.001* -0.007* 0.000* 0.000* 0.093* — 
TN 0.457 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.379 6.2% 
TX 0.363 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000* -1.271 4.1% 
UT 0.298 -0.002 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -2.017 1.2% 
VT 0.429 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -1.372 2.5% 
VA 0.526 0.000 0.000 -0.020* -0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.933 5.4% 
WA 0.344 -0.002 0.000 0.000* -0.006 0.000* 0.001 -1.199 4.3% 
WV 0.242 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 0.000* -0.001 -0.782 5.1% 
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State 
Black 
Applicant
285
 
Loan 
Amount 
286
 
HUD 
Income
287
 
Minority 
Population
288
 
Median 
Income 
of 
MSA 
289
 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing
290
 
Income 
291 
Constant 
292
 
Increase of 
Probability 
for Black 
Applicant
293
 
WI 0.373 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.008 0.000* -0.001 -0.482 3.4% 
WY 0.338 -0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 9.456 0.5% 
* = Statistically insignificant; Pr < 0.05 = Variable had too little variation to be included in the model 
TABLE 5: 2006 CONTROL DATA—HUD-CLASSIFIED SUBPRIME LENDER294 
State 
Black 
Applicant
295
 
Loan 
Amount 
296
 
HUD 
Income
297
 
Minority 
Population
298
 
Median 
Income 
of 
MSA 
299
 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing
300
 
Income 
301 
Constant 
302
 
Increase of 
Probability 
for Black 
Applicant
303
 
AL 0.848 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.004 0.000* -0.002 -0.535 11.3% 
AK 0.671 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 1.850 14% 
AZ 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.000* 0.000 -0.670 9.3% 
AR 0.918 0.000* 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -2.455 13.6% 
CA 0.417 0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.011 0.000* -0.002 0.556 5.3% 
CO 0.546 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.007 0.000* -0.001 -2.371 8% 
CT 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.417 7.2% 
DE 0.551 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.005 -1.500 8.9% 
DC 1.031 0.001 — 0.020 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* -4.479 13.1% 
FL 0.552 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.643 9.3% 
GA 0.861 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.990 14.3% 
HI 0.470 0.000* 0.000 0.011 -0.006 0.000* -0.001 -0.873 — 
 
294. Estimating the effect of race, borrower characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics 
on the likelihood that a borrower receives a loan from a HUD-Classified Subprime Lender versus 
receiving a loan from a prime lender. 
295. Dummy variable representing whether the borrower was black (versus white). 
296. Amount of the loan (in thousands of dollars). 
297. The maximum income for qualification for HUD services in the census tract. 
298. The percentage of the census tract that is not white. 
299. The median income (in thousands) in the MSA. 
300. The percentage of housing in the census tract that is owner-occupied. 
301. The income of the borrower (in thousands). 
302. The constant, or the baseline level of subprime lending, represents the base probability of 
receiving a subprime loan (i.e., the log odds that a white person receives a subprime loan). 
303. The change in probability if all other variables are kept at their means, but the race of the 
borrower changes from white to black.  This is calculated using Clarify software, developed by Gary 
King. 
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State 
Black 
Applicant
295
 
Loan 
Amount 
296
 
HUD 
Income
297
 
Minority 
Population
298
 
Median 
Income 
of 
MSA 
299
 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing
300
 
Income 
301 
Constant 
302
 
Increase of 
Probability 
for Black 
Applicant
303
 
ID 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.002* -0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.011* 12.3% 
IL 0.513 0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.006 0.000* -0.001 -1.441 11.2% 
IN 0.513 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.129 7.5% 
IA 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.002* -0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.011 8.7% 
KS 0.597 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.880 12.1% 
KY 0.603 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.191 9% 
LA 1.029 0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -1.801 12.8% 
ME 0.844 0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 0.000* -0.003 1.421 14.6% 
MD 0.408 -0.0007 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -1.459 5.8% 
MA 0.582 0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.011 0.000 -0.002 0.574 10.1% 
MI 0.517 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.296 6.1% 
MN 0.821 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.159 13.2% 
MS 1.067 0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -1.972 14.2% 
MO 0.708 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.007 0.000 -0.003 -0.711 12.1% 
MT 0.638 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.979 9.9% 
NE 0.664 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 0.549 10.4% 
NV 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.429 11.6% 
NH 0.775 0.002 0.000 -0.016 -0.011 0.000 -0.004 1.244 11% 
NJ 0.412 0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.006 0.000* -0.002 -0.810 7.1% 
NM 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.000* -0.002 -0.436 9.2% 
NY 0.407 0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -1.699 12.3% 
NC 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.429 9.3% 
ND 0.265* 0.002* 0.000* -0.005* -0.003* 0.000* -0.003* -0.050* — 
OH 0.549 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.008 — -0.003 0.224 11.9% 
OK 0.702 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -1.310 9.1% 
OR 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.695 8.7% 
PA 0.460 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 0.544 11.2% 
RI 0.232 0.002 — 0.006 -0.013 0.000 -0.003 -0.423 7.6% 
SC 0.943 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.000* -0.003 -0.790 15.5% 
SD 0.293* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* -0.006* 0.000* 0.000* -0.670* — 
TN 0.935 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.000* -0.003 -0.246 13.3% 
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TX 0.828 0.001 0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -1.137 15.2% 
UT 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.017 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.708 10% 
VT 0.464 0.001 0.000 -0.048 -0.016 0.000 -0.002 1.948 9.6% 
VA 0.704 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.003 -0.624 9.2% 
WA 0.536 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 -0.351 13.3% 
WV 0.491 0.002 0.000* 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 -1.655 12.2% 
WI 0.559 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 0.119 6.9% 
WY 0.643 0.000* 0.000 -0.002* -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -7.122 9.1% 
 
TABLE 6: 2006, 2002, AND 1998 CONTROL DATA—HUD-CLASSIFIED 
SUBPRIME LENDER 
 
Year 
Black 
Applicant 
Loan 
Amount 
HUD 
Income 
Minority 
Population 
Median 
Income 
of MSA 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing 
Income Constant 
2006 0.324 0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.004 0 0 -0.653 
2002 0.19825 -0.001 0.000* 0.002* -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -1.892 
1998 0.12362 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.015 -0.012 -2.348 
 
  
 
